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1. INTRODUCTION 
Whatever happened to the study of restitution? Once a core 
private law subject along with property, torts, and contracts, restitu-
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tion has receded from American legal scholarship.1 Few law 
professors teach the material, fewer still write in the area, and no 
one even agrees what the field comprises anymore.2 Hanoch 
Dagan's Unjust Enrichment: A Study of Private Law and Public 
Values3 threatens to reverse the tide and make restitution interest-
ing again. The book takes commonplace words such as "value" and 
"gain" and shows how they embody a society's underlying norma-
tive principles. Variations across cultures in the law of unjust en-
richment reflect differences in national understandings of sharing, 
property, and even personhood. As Dagan puts it, he seeks "the 
reflection of core social values in the technicalities of the law" 
(p. 1). 
The law at issue can be briefly summarized (and its more tedi-
ous complexities elided). Imagine, for example, someone chops 
trees from your land. Tort and contract law focus on remedying 
your loss. The law of unjust enrichment, however, is primarily con-
cerned with restoring to you the trespasser's gain from using the 
lumber. Dagan's book reveals a complex inquiry hiding behind this 
simple distinction. Measuring restitution by the defendant's gain is 
a prologue to the further analysis of how a society understands 
value. Within the American legal system, the tree-chopper's gain 
may be defined as the lumber's fair market value, or can be calcu-
lated in terms of the chopper's net profits, the full proceeds from 
sale, or by a range of increasingly abstract methods. Within a single 
legal system, these various measures may all be available, each 
linked to restitution of a particular type of resource, each animated 
by different normative concerns. Dagan argues that restitutionary 
choices within a culture track attitudes towards property and per-
sonhood; overarching patterns across cultures reflect divergent na-
tional ethoses. Restitution is a window into a larger project of 
social understanding. 
1. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1191, 1191 (1995) 
("Few American lawyers, judges, or law professors are familiar with even the standard pro-
positions of the doctrine .... " (emphasis omitted». 
2. See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity o/the Benefit Principle, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 1369, 
1371 (1994) ("At one point restitution was a standard course in the upper-year curriculum, 
but over time and with the ever greater expansion of public law subjects, it has slowly disap-
peared from view, being subsumed in a more general course on remedies, or taught in the 
interstices of the basic law of property, tort, and contract."); Kull, supra note 1, at 1195 n.14 
(noting that restitution was a standard part of the law curriculum a generation ago, but only a 
"bare handful of American law schools" offer the course today); Saul Levmore, Explaining 
Restitution, 71 U. VA. L. REv. 65, 65 (1985) ("There is probably no greater set of surprising 
results and inconsistent maxims in private law than that formed by cases dealing with claims 
for payment made by providers of 'non-bargained benefits' to silent or disclaiming 
recipients. "). 
3. Hanoch Dagan is a Senior Lecturer, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law and a Visiting 
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
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. In this review we put Dagan's jurisprudential approach to a 
practical test.4 Restitution is going global; today, the postcom-
munist rebuilding of market economies, social developments in 
South Africa and Cuba, and even Native American and African-
American claims are at the cutting edge of restitution.5 We focus 
on Eastern Europe, where the Czechs are putting elderly people 
back into their childhood apartments, while the Hungarians offer 
compensation coupons for use in privatization auctions.6 Govern-
ments are valuing the unjust gains of - and more often the losses 
inflicted by - the communists in radically different ways as they 
attempt to reconnect with a precommunist past. Yet little theoreti-
cal work explains the rise of and variations among these massive 
programs of property reallocation.7 
If Dagan's theory makes sense, and we think it does, then his 
book can provide some order for the hodgepodge of national 
mythmaking, political accident, and cultural posturing that sur-
rounds the restitution frenzy in newly emerging market economies.8 
His framework helps explain postcommunist restitutionary pro-
grams and points to some surprising results: more aggressive resti-
tution may prove less protective of private property rights. In tum, 
the Eastern European experience challenges Dagan's portrayal of 
4. A wholly different review of Dagan's book could be written, parsing his jurisprudential 
argument on selfhood and altruism in relation to Thomas Nagel, Duncan Kennedy, Joseph 
Raz, Ernest Weinrib, and a full host of legal philosophers. We are more practically minded 
folk and therefore co=end our jurisprudentially oriented colleagues to Dagan's text itself, 
particularly Chapters 2 and 3. 
5. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Restitution of Expropriated Property: Post-Soviet Lessons 
for Cuba, 34 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 621 (1996); Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Rep-
arations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. REv. 453 
(1994); Irma Jacqueline Ozer, Reparations for African Americans, 41 How. L.J. 479 (1998); 
Rob Nixon, White Farms, Black Claims, N.Y. TIMES, May 31,1994, at A17. 
6. See Cheryl Gray, The Legal Framework for Private Sector Activity in the Czech 
Republic, 26 V AND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 271 (1993) (discussing Czech restitution); Cheryl Gray, 
Rebecca Hanson & Michael Heller, Hungarian Legal Reform for the Private Sector, 26 GEO. 
WASH. J. INTL. L. & EeoN. 293, 308-10 (1992) (outlining the coupon compensation program). 
7. Postsocialist restitution scholarship is predominantly descriptive. See, e.g., infra note 
22. Perhaps the best theoretical discussion is provided by Claus Offe, Disqualification, Retri-
bution, Restitution: Dilemmas of Justice in Post-Communist Transitions, 1 J. POL. PHIL. 17 
(1993). 
8. One might argue that postsocialist restitution does not fit within a technical unjust 
enrichment paradigm. See Kull, supra note 1, at 1212-22 (arguing that restoration of re-
sources is not part of unjust enrichment). Restoration of property to former owners seems 
more concerned with remedying the plaintiffs' losses than undoing the defendant co=u-
nists' gains. This approach, however, may sound in unjust enrichment law when harm ex-
ceeds gain, as was typical in socialist societies. For Dagan's position, see p. 17 (arguing that 
plaintiff's harm can be a restitutionary remedy). Many leading co=entators have placed 
restoration squarely within the law of unjust enrichment. See John P. Dawson, Restitution 
Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REv. 563, 610 (1981); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Sig-
nificance of Restitution, 67 TEXAS L. REv. 1277, 1284 (1989). We do not see much point in 
this hyper-formal taxonomic debate. Dagan's method proves useful whether postsocialist 
restitution is restitution rightly considered or something else. 
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the feel-good ethos of sharing by suggesting a richer and more 
troubling take on the meaning of community. By distilling doctri-
nal complexity through a sensitive jurisprudential filter, Dagan of-
fers a new way to study private law. 
II. ROADMAP TO RESTITUTION 
A. The Argument in Brief 
Dagan's book is an easy read. Without too many bows to past 
masters, the book is cleanly written and tightly argued. The Pro-
logue encapsulates the story, while the following chapters are a dis-
ciplined march through his theory concluding with concrete 
applications to and comparisons among American, Talmudic, and 
international law. 
From a large range of available restitution paradigms, Dagan 
focuses solely on the example of a defendant who is unjustly en-
riched by using a plaintiffs resource.9 Dagan avoids difficulties de-
fining the scope of unjust enrichment in either the American or 
comparative setting because his goal is to "abstract[] from the 
contextual contingencies of any specific set of restitutionary rules, 
and to extricate the essence - the common denominator - of the 
ways various societies implement the general principle against un-
just enrichment" (p. 3). Across cultures and spanning a breadth of 
resources, -social values are reflected in methods of valuation. This 
is more than a clever semantic point; by linking available measures 
of recovery with specific social values, Dagan provides a "transla-
tion scheme" for interpreting the meaning of valuation, summa-
rized usefully in a simple table (p. 22). 
Dagan has two distinct projects in uneasy relation to each other. 
The first project is to explain variations in restitutionary remedies 
within a single culture. He relates those variations to the divergent 
rationales a society may seek to vindicate across a range of socially 
important resources. For example, Chapter Four sets out a detailed 
intracultural analysis of Americans' relationship with various re-
sources. The more the specific property implicates its owner's "per-
sonhood" -like her body, her land, or maybe her car - the more 
likely the legal system will be to protect her control over the prop-
erty rather than merely to restore her ex ante well-being. 
The second project is more ambitious yet: to look across na-
tionallegal systems and show how distinct national ethoses animate 
broader restitutionary patterns. Chapters Five and Six make this 
9. This form of restitution is often referred to as "restitution for wrongs" and is concep-
tually, if not analytically, distinct from cases in which a plaintiff confers a benefit on a defend-
ant. See, e.g., ANDREW BURROWS & EWAN MCKENDRICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
LAW OF REsTmmON 569 (1997). 
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comparison as they explore Talmudic civil law and intemationallaw 
respectively. While Dagan's first project strikes us as more compel-
ling than the second, both parts of his effort contribute to revaluing 
restitution as a field for theoretical work. 
B. The Translation Scheme 
1. Definitions 
Measures of restitutionary recovery range from the harm suf-
fered by a plaintiff to several types of gain secured by a defendant. 
Gain, in tum, can mean quite different things, depending on the 
doctrinal niche in which the term is invoked. Gain can mean the 
fair market value of the appropriated resource or the defendant's 
net profits. It can refer to a defendant's gross proceeds from using 
an appropriated resource, in which case the defendant will be made 
worse-off than before she was unjustly enriched (assuming nonzero 
expenses in using the resource). Or gain can be measured as the 
greater or lesser of any combination of these values. Dagan points 
out that the ex post method of valuation will affect how vigorously 
people's resources are protected ex ante from appropriation and 
will signal a society's tolerance for appropriating another's property 
(p. 15). With the lowest measure of gain, defendants may readily 
appropriate resources they believe they can put to better use than 
the plaintiff; with the highest measure of gain, defendants may hesi-
tate to take resources despite being confident their uses are more 
highly valued. 
The question raised by the wide variety of restitutionary reme-
dies is why, for any given resource, a legal system would choose one 
remedy over another. Dagan suggests that the specific measures of 
recovery noted above express various rationales that a society may 
be trying to vindicate, specifically well-being, control, sharing, and 
condemnation (pp. 15-16, 22). The argument concentrates primarily 
on well-being and control, which are defined by reference to the 
familiar distinction between "liability" and "property" rules.10 
Well-being mirrors a liability rule in which "ex post pecuniary re-
covery is intended as a surrogate for ex ante consent" (p. 15). This 
rationale maintains an individual's initial level of wealth. Control, 
by contrast, mirrors a property rule by requiring the resource 
holder's ex ante consent before the resource may be taken. While 
restitution operates in a sphere in which a forced transfer has al-
ready occurred, certain rules for recovery can actually vindicate ex 
ante control over resources by deterring invasions. 
10. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra~ 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
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Dagan's "translation scheme" demonstrates how different meas-
ures of restitutionary recovery relate to control, well-being, or both. 
Assuming that the plaintiff was harmed less than the defendant was 
enriched - a presupposition Dagan makes in his paradigmatic case 
(p. 13) - measuring recovery as the plaintiff's harm encourages a 
savvy defendant to appropriate resources from plaintiffs who value 
them less than either the defendant or the market. In such a case, 
measuring restitution by the plaintiff's harm promotes sharing of 
resources by encouraging more efficient users to take without per-
mission. Restoring the resource's fair market value protects the 
plaintiff's well-being by restoring her to her ex ante level of wealth, 
including her ability to sell the resource at market value. A recov-
ery of net profits vindicates the plaintiff's control by removing a 
potential appropriator's economic incentive to take the plaintiff's 
resources, regardless of the defendant's higher valued use of those 
resources. Finally, a recovery of gross proceeds (not offset by the 
appropriator's expenses in using the resource) may be reserved for 
cases where a society wants not only to protect the plaintiff's con-
trol, but also to express its condemnation of the defendant's 
action,11 
These four rationales motivate different levels of recovery and 
comprise the heart of Dagan's theory of valuation.12 "Choosing 
amongst these possibilities is not a purely theoretical enterprise; 
rather, it dictates and shapes the available remedies" (p. 15). The 
pattern of restitution that a national legal system offers - fair mar-
ket value for certain resources, net profits for others, and so on -
is, Dagan claims, purposive, nonarbitrary, and subtly revealing of 
the contours of a national psyche. 
2. American Law Application 
In the American legal system, the law of unjust enrichment of-
fers a menu of restitutionary remedies across a spectrum of re-
sources (pp. 71-108). Within this single national setting, 
restitutionary awards can be explained by the extent to which they 
implicate the owner's "personhood." As Dagan writes: 
11. It would be possible to construct a slightly different translation scheme in which 
"gross proceeds" were merely another but more effective method of protecting control. If, as 
Dagan claims, ex post recovery vindicates control by acting as an ex ante disincentive to ap-
propriate (p. 15), then a higher level of recovery is just a more effective deterrent. 
12. Dagan also introduces the concept of proportional profits whereby courts "recon-
struct[] the way the parties would have divided the contractual surplus under circumstances 
of full information" (pp. 19-20). Proportional profits are a useful addition to the traditional 
Calabresi & Melamed matrix, protecting something between the resource-holder's well-being 
and control. We omit this restitutionary remedy from our Figure 1 and from the remainder 
of our account because it does not substantially help us illuminate Dagan's theory or unravel 
our postsocialist application. 
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[T]he sphere of control American law is expected to confer on its 
constituents will not be absolute, but rather will occur along a contin-
uum of diminishing interests: from core interests (one's identity, 
physical integrity, reputation as dignity, and land) through less-
protected interests (copyright, and to a lesser degree, commercial at-
tributes of one's personality and patents) to least-protected interests 
(contractual relations and performances and information). [p.71] 
In America, restitutionary recovery for core resources - such as 
for a trespass involving land -, is often valued at the higher of fair 
market value or profits, thus vindicating what Dagan refers to as 
"well-being and control" (p. 75). In contrast, patents are protected 
from infringement only by an ex post award of fair market value 
(pp. 87-89). Dagan suggests that this lower level of protection 
shows that patents in America are less personal to their holder than 
certain rights in land may be. Therefore, if the infringer can make 
more beneficial use of the patent than the market price reflects, he 
or she may capture the excess gain and actually be encouraged to 
infringe. Figure 1 suggests the relationship Dagan is noting: 
C:-
~ Proceeds x § 
~ Net Profits x 
FMV x 
Harm x 
Contracts Patents Land Body 
Level of "Personhood" 
FIGURE 1: Explaining Variation in American 
Restitutionary Remedies 
What seems to be arbitrary variation in the definition of gain to 
the defendant derives from intracultural values regarding 
personhood - a range of restitutionary values available within the 
American legal system (summarized in a second useful table, p. 
107). Dagan's exploration of Americans' relationship with various 
resources is astute, but raises some questions. Why does trespass-
ing on land implicate personhood interests more than infringing on 
a patent? Perhaps the level of restitutionary recovery serves as an 
indicator of the "personhood quotient," so we learn from the resti-
tutionary ru1es that Americans value patents less than land. Or the 
prediction cou1d work the other way around: if we believe patents 
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have lesser personhood quality, we should expect a lower measure 
of recovery for their infringement. Because, in fact, we see a lower 
recovery, his theory is confirmed. We are not sure which way the 
causation runs in what Dagan calls his "retrodictive" approach, 
which he defines as "the ability ... to predict prior events: here the 
details of the pertinent [restitutionary] doctrines" (p. 8). Dagan 
suggests a dynamic relationship between the social understanding 
of a resource and its legal protection. "Our attitudes towards one 
another and the prescriptions of our legal regime are embedded in 
one holistic web, each inculcating, and inculcated by, the other" (p. 
39). The claim may be circular.13 
The predictive (or, as Dagan would say, retrodictive) force of 
the argument also leaves out courts' frequent consideration of the 
defendant's good or bad faith behavior and numerous other moral 
and conventionally utilitarian concerns. For example, how courts 
value restitution often depends on whether the defendant was act-
ing in good faith when he wrongly chopped the plaintiff's lumber. 
Dagan notes that courts will award gross proceeds if the defendant 
was acting in bad faith and the higher of fair market value and prof-
its if the defendant's trespass was unintentional or innocent (p. 74). 
While this distinction reflects different rationales for recovery -
condemnation versus well-being and control - it is unclear to us 
why the defendant's motives should matter in Dagan's model, 
which asserts that the relevant variables are the national socio-
economic ethos and the character of the resource. An account 
could probably be developed to suggest why people in certain socie-
ties are more harmed by intentional rather than innocent appropri-
ation.14 A given society may prefer to protect well-being if the 
trespass is unintentional but vindicate control for purposeful inva-
sions. Dagan's account, however, does not explain why this distinc-
tion should be true and leaves us to ponder the ambiguous role of 
the defendant's bad faith in his model.15 Nevertheless, Dagan's 
13. For example, we find Dagan's suggestion that patents are less personal than copy· 
rights plausible but not obvious. As evidence for his claim, Dagan points to the different 
methods of valuing patent and copyright infringement (pp. 82·89). The argument, however, 
seems to assume what he is trying to prove: that methods of valuation correspond to the 
personhood quotient of various resources. 
14. Cf. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of 
Takings, 112 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1007-09 (1999) (arguing that a per se takings rule for physi-
cal invasions - such as that suggested by Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419 (1982) - may lead to perverse results if government agencies respond by in-
flicting more costly, but nonphysical and hence noncompensable harms on property owners); 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1227 (1967) (suggesting that "[aJctual, 
physical use or occupation by the public of private property may make it seem rather spe-
cially likely that the owner is sustaining a distinctly disproportionate share of the cost of some 
social undertaking."). 
15. The defendant's motives have long been a source of debate in the restitution scholar-
ship. See John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1410 
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framework does analytic work explaining the otherwise odd variety 
of methods that courts use to value a· defendant's gain. 
C. Restitution and National Ethos 
Dagan's second argument is that legal systems are each charac-
terized by a "socio-economic ethos" that varies along a scale of 
communitarian fellow-feeling. The book's final two chapters make 
this point by moving from an intra- to an intercultural analysis. In 
particular, Dagan switches to the quite distinct system of Talmudic 
civil law, parsing ancient religious texts to uncover the animating 
ethos of Jewish law. Given their different traditions, juxtaposing 
American and Talmudic law could be an odd choice if one system 
were intended to inform, or comment on the other. Dagan, how-
ever, uses the very heterogeneity of the systems he studies as a way 
to sharpen distinctions.16 For these purposes, Imperial Chinese law 
could have been equally apt as a comparison. 
Dagan's approach seems straightforward. Various measures of 
recovery encourage different levels of appropriation or involuntary 
resource transfers: namely, restitution affects the amount of forced 
sharing. Cross-cultural variations in the measure of restitutionary 
recovery reflect differences in societies' communitarianism specifi-
cally, and social ethos generally. For example, with Americans, 
"one can expect that the rules of the American doctrine will be 
concentrated mainly between control and well-being. . . . The 
American commitment to the individualistic values of desert and 
negative liberty is moderated by some - albeit fairly weak - egali-
tarian and needs-based convictions" (pp. 60-61). And indeed, the 
American legal system often measures restitutionary gain by the 
defendant's net profits; thus reducing incentives to appropriate by 
recapturing any possible gain from using a wrongfully taken 
resource.17 
By contrast, in a more collective legal culture, people may some-
times permit appropriations when society gains overall. If a restitu-
tionary award only restores the amount the original owner is 
harmed, then potential appropriators may take resources they can 
(1974). Dagan's desire to address the issue is understandable but seemingly outside his ana-
lytic structure. 
16. See p. 7 ("[C]omparative law is instrumental in establishing a 'liberating distance' 
from the dominant legal consciousness, thus uncovering the political and moral (often hid-
den) significance of legal doctrine. However, in order to be able to enjoy this important 
advantage, the comparativist should refer to legal systems that are set in environments which 
are culturally remote from our contemporary Western circumstances."). 
17. Of course, people will still have an incentive to appropriate others' resources if their 
chance of being successfully sued is less than 100%. Nevertheless, awarding net profits acts 
as a more significant ex ante deterrent for potential appropriators than awarding fair market 
value (assuming that the appropriator can put the resource to an unusually valuable use). 
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better use and retain any difference between the harm inflicted and 
the gain received. Dagan characterizes such a culture as sharing-
oriented and offers Talmudic law as an example of this more com-
munitarian ethos, noting that: "It seems safe to conjecture that the 
Judaic doctrinal rules are more of the sharing type" (p. 61). Across 
cultures, then, the tone or shape of restitution partakes of and in 
turn helps to constitute ingrained national values (p. 39). 
This may in fact be the case, but the Talmudic case study Dagan 
provides is not entirely parallel to the American law examples. 
Dagan effectively uses the American system to demonstrate in-
tracultural variation, but he does not provide comparable detail on 
the Talmudic law side. He focuses instead on a single (though ap-
parently much-parsed) hypothetical: "[W]here the defendant de-
rives a benefit and the plaintiff sustains no loss, for example where 
the premises of the plaintiff-landowner were not for hire (so that 
the harm was zero), and the defendant-squatter had no alternative 
accommodations" (p. 113). In such a case a Talmudic "exemption 
rule" applies, permitting the squatter-defendant to keep the 
amount he was enriched by the trespass. This outcome, Dagan 
claims, reflects the ethos of sharing embedded in the Talmudic law. 
The rule does not apply, however, the moment the plaintiff suffers 
some harm. Further exceptions to the "exemption rule" also limit 
its applicability so that the rule does not tell us much about the 
Talmudic ethic as a whole or give much footing for making an inter-
cultural comparison.18 
The "exemption rule" may indeed reflect a religious ethos con-
cerned with sharing. It might be possible to generalize from this 
one example and explore how Talmudic civil law embodies a com-
munitarian concern in other, unexpected cases. It might also be 
possible to demonstrate that the Talmudic law of restitution differs 
from the American law with regard to specific resources, perhaps 
from culturally different understandings of the relevant resource. 
Yet Dagan does not make the direct comparison, leaving the reader 
to infer the contrast between American and Talmudic law. 
Dagan concludes with a look at international law, where he at-
tempts to find a coherent ethos regarding compensation for govern-
mental expropriation.19 We find this chapter the least persuasive 
because the issue of expropriation in international law remains a 
18. Those further exceptions include cases where the plaintiff protests (pp. 120·21), where 
there is any positive enrichment to the defendant in the form of profits (pp. 121-24), and 
where the defendant is willing to pay (pp. 124-27). Dagan has, however, chosen an example 
that is central to Talmudic civil law. 
19. As an aside, when an individual takes your resource without permission, we call it 
"appropriation"; when a government takes the resource, we term it "expropriation." 
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source of conflict, not coherence.2o More generally, this material 
raises some questions about Dagan's method itself. He notes that 
the effort to identify a national "socio-economic ethos" Guts across 
"numerous different traditions" and "ideological conflicts" (p. 51), 
but he nevertheless claims to capture some generalized "essence" 
of specific societies and legal systems - American, Talmudic, and 
international. Can an ethos be so easily distilled? The stereotype 
that Americans value negative liberty is ubiquitous, but hard to pin 
down. Do Texans value negative liberty more than Michiganders? 
Conservatives more than liberals? The vast array of American val-
ues does not easily accommodate a single national ethos. 
Our natural objection to being neatly. ~ategorized perhaps ob-
scures some plausible truth to Dagan's claim. Americans may be 
more committed to negative liberty than people in some other 
countries. On the Talmudic side, it is hardly surprising to find a 
religious code concerned at some level with sharing, for one would 
expect to find the same in every other religion's ethical texts. But 
how does this aspirational document connect with the national 
ethos of contemporary Jews? Of Israelis? And, while it is improba-
ble enough to discern a coherent ethos within a national or religious 
culture, we find ethos hunting even less credible at the international 
level. 
A second difficulty with Dagan's presentation is how to tease 
apart the relationship between intracultural attitudes towards per-
sonhood and an intercultural ethos of sharing. For any particular 
resource, a difference in the restitutionary remedy between two 
legal systems is susceptible to either a resource-specific or national 
ethos explanation. Imagine, for example, that the American legal 
system has more control-oriented restitutionary remedies for unjust 
enrichment involving cars than the (updated) Talmudic response. 
This difference could equally result from an idiosyncratic attach-
ment to cars in American culture as it could from a pervasive Tal-
mudi.c emphasis on sharing transportation. Figure 2 suggests two 
ways in which the Talmudic system might differ from the American. 
Under the Sharing Interpretation, the Talmud places a systemati-
cally higher value on sharing and thus offers lower restitutionary 
remedies for each resource on the personhood continuum. By con-
trast, according to the Personhood Interpretation, the Talmud 
places different personhood weights on particular resources so that 
some resources receive more protection than in the American sys-
tem, some less, some coincidentally the same. Dagan does not offer 
20. See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, .AN !Nrn.ODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 24647 (3d ed. 
1999) (noting that whether there are "customary norms of international law providing inter-
national minimum standards that all states must meet regardless of treaty obligations is 
highly controversial, the positions of the Western states being much at odds with those of 
Third World nations"). 
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a sufficiently parallel or detailed comparison to allow the reader to 
decide whether Talmudic law is systematically more sharing-
oriented, or whether it simply treats some particular resources as 
more invested in a person's essence than does the American 
system. 
~ Proceeds g 








Contracts Patents Land Body 
Level of "Personhood" 
FIGURE 2: Untangling Personhood and Sharing in 
Intercultural Comparisons 
This level of detailed comparison, however, goes beyond 
Dagan's project. He succeeds in his more important goal of re-
vealing that restitutionary remedies may have a coherent structure 
explained by the intracultural factors and intercultural ethoses he 
identifies. Regardless of the precision of his comparisons, Dagan 
shows that methods of valuation can embody vastly different social 
values. His theory provides a theoretical context for thinking more 
systematically about the problem of valuation in law. Valuation of 
gain or harm, often dismissed as a merely technical matter, reflects 
normative principles at the core of a national legal ethos. Applied 
to the problem of restitution, Dagan's framework explains other-
wise incongruous measures of recovery. 
More generally, Dagan addresses the undertheorized link be-
tween concrete measures of valuation and abstract social values. If 
his approach succeeds, then it should be able to teach us something 
about new situations - such as the restitutionary practices in di-
verse transitions from socialist to market economies. Restitution is 
not only an interesting theoretical puzzle, as Dagan shows, but also 
a value-laden policy adventure in much of the world today. 
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Ill. PUTTING REsTITUTION TO THE TEST 
Restitution has been a core element of postsocialist transition, 
transferring the equivalent of billions of dollars in resources to prior 
owners. While the recent frenzy of restitution has been most exten-
sive in Eastern Europe, new programs keep popping up elsewhere 
as well.21 The programs' forms are as numerous as the countries 
that are adopting them. The question we take up here is whether 
the diversity among restitution programs expresses something more 
than interesting curiosity or contingent political fact. Recent litera-
ture on restitution, mainly describing postsocialist transition in 
Eastern Europe, does not help solve the puzzle.22 Some commenta-
tors suggest that restitution reflects attempts by weak new govern-
ments to distinguish themselves from communist predecessors; 
others say that restitution may be an expedient way to shift re-
sources to private ownership. Perhaps the programs represent sim-
ple power politics. Perhaps not. These accounts fail to make sense 
of the variety of restitutionary rules. 
Dagan's method suggests a more useful way to think about resti-
tution, going beyond dry technicalities to the guts of nation-
building.23 Choices about who gets what back may help us discern 
core national attitudes towards important resources. Note, though, 
that just as Dagan's approach helps explain postsocialist restitution, 
real-world practice, in turn, challenges and refines Dagan's theory. 
A. The Relationship Between Privatization and Restitution 
Most of the time we acquire property through purchase or 
through some other method that accepts the prior owner's title as 
legitimate. When a country shifts away from socialism, however, 
this basic equation is disrupted and policymakers are cast out into 
an uncertain wilderness of first principles. State property, including 
21. See supra note 5 (noting South African, Cuban, Native-American, and African-Amer-
ican cases). 
22. See, e.g., Josef Burger, Politics of Restitution in Czechoslovakia, 26 E. EURo. Q. 485 
(1993); Anna Gelpero, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-Central Europe: A 
Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. lNrL. Bus. L. 315 (1993); Offe, supra note 7; Jeffrey J. Renzulli, 
Claims of u.s. Nationals Under the Restitution Laws of Czechoslovakia, 15 B.C. lNrL. & 
CaMP. L. REv. 165 (1992); Richard W. Crowder, Comment, Restitution in the Czech 
Republic: Problems and Prague-Nosis, 5 INn. lNrL. & CoMP. L. REv. 237 (1994); Michael L. 
Neff, Comment, Eastern Europe's Policy of Restitution of Property in the 1990s, 10 DICK. J. 
lNn.. L. 357 (1992); Heather M. Stack, Note, The "Colonization" of East Germany?: A Com-
parative Analysis of German Privatization, 46 DUKE LJ. 1211 (1997); Frank Banker & Claus 
Offe, The Morality of Restitution: Considerations on Some Normative Questions Raised by 
the 'fransition to a Private Economy (June 18, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors). 
23. See also Gelpero, supra note 22, at 317 ("Extremely popular despite their uncertain 
economic significance, reprivatization initiatives offer insights into the nation-building agen-
das of the governments which preside over them."). Note that in the transition literature, the 
term "reprivatization" is synonymous with "restitution." 
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nearly everything with economic value, is put up for grabs. And 
because people do grab, decisions about restitution programs must 
be made quickly before "spontaneous privatization" (a nice, post-
socialist term for wholesale theft of state assets) renders the prob-
lem moot.24 
Before defining a restitution program, a country must decide 
which resources to keep public - parks? railroads? streets? - and 
which to transfer to private ownership. They may transfer re-
sources through a privatization program - giveaway vouchers? 
sales? auctions? - or through restitution. Each of these initial de-
cisions is fraught with political meaning. Privatization of a factory 
by sale or auction partly legitimizes the prior socialist ownership of 
the factory, even as it practically makes funds available for the new 
reformist government. Giveaways of apartments to the current oc-
cupants imply that those occupants already rightfully own the 
apartments while recognizing their real need for a place to stay. 
Each mode of privatization carries its own verdict on the prior 
property regime.25 
The relationship between restitution and privatization in post-
socialist reforms is perhaps a useful one to note. Wherever it 
reaches, restitution denies the claims of current occupants or state 
owners. Restitution reknits a country with its distant past, excises 
the socialist period, and labels as unjust any intervening ownership. 
In Dagan's terms, the more that restitution prevails, the more it 
may reveal a national ethos committed to negative liberty; while 
privatization may suggest (in a surprising twist) a greater ethos of 
sharing. 
Consider the ratio of privatization to restitution programs as 
one moves from west to east across Europe. While all the countries 
have privatized widely, the former East Germany also has a far-
reaching restitution program, the Central European countries have 
some restitution, and Russia has none.26 Consistent with Dagan's 
theory, the Russians lived the longest under a nominally sharing-
oriented socialist regime and they have the shallowest tradition of 
entrepreneurship (even before the Soviets, the Tsar's feudal system 
left little room for dispersed individual landownership). East 
Germany, conversely, retained a robust private property regime 
even under communist rule, maintaining a control-oriented concep-
24. See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REpORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO 
MARKET 48-63 (1996) (outlining options for privatization and paths taken by postsocialist 
countries). 
25. See Gelpem, supra note 22, at 315; Stack, supra note 22, at 1221 ("In theory, then, 
restitution sought to achieve a degree of parity between historic injustices and current eco-
nomic needs."). 
26. See generally Gelpem, supra note 22. 
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tion of private property rights that perhaps finds new voice in the 
country's restitution laws. 
B. The Variety of Restitution 
Vindicating pre communist ownership through restitution raises 
diverse problems. Notice, however, how closely the situation paral-
lels Dagan's basic paradigm but on a massive scale. Socialist rulers 
divested people of their property in forced transfers (now deemed 
unjust) to new owners whom the state believed could make more 
valuable use of the expropriated resources. 
While restitutionary programs vary tremendously in their de-
tails,27 we group the variety along four main axes:28 (1) The types of 
lost resources that may be restituted - only real property? corpo-
rate stock? prison time? (2) The people who can benefit - only 
living citizens? exiles? corporations? religious communities? (3) 
The form that restitution takes - the land itself? roughly 
equivalent land? current or former fair market value? partial cash 
payment or voucher?29 And (4) the time period that restitution 
covers - excising only the socialist period? stretching back to 
cover Nazi expropriations of Jews and others? 
Each point is fiercely contested, and each helps us to reflect on 
Dagan's project. Just as Dagan pares away the multitude of restitu-
tionary paradigms to focus on a single case, we focus on a single 
contrast, between the Czech Republic and Hungary, to motivate 
our discussion. The former East Germany and Russia may work as 
well. So may Poland and Lithuania. Our pairing is open to a simi-
lar criticism as Dagan's paradigm - that a different choice may 
result in quite a different story. We offer the same defense as does 
he: we are only testing his method, not offering an exhaustive ac-
count of postsocialist restitution. With those disclaimers, we note 
that the Czech Republic and Hungary form a sufficiently complex 
comparison to start thinking about how national practice, national 
ethos, and attitudes towards property and personhood might inter-
act in postsocialist transition. 
1. Restitution in the Czech Republic 
Restitution in the Czech Republic is one of the largest such pro-
grams in Eastern Europe. Favoring a policy of "natural" restitution 
(an interesting word choice as we-shall see), the Czech government 
is restoring a still inestimable amount of property to its pre com-
27. See id. at 315-16. 
28. See id. at 323. 
29. See Neff, supra note 22, at 361. 
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munist owners or their heirs.30 Truck drivers, shoe moguls, western 
bankers, human rights activists, elderly men and women ,vith dis-
tant memories of expropriated properties, and heirs to ancient es-
tates are among the many people repossessing property in the 
former Czechoslovakia (now separated into the Czech Republic, 
where we focus our attention, and Slovakia, which we do not ex-
amine ).31 The Czech Republic's sweeping restitutionary program 
codifies normative policy decisions along each of the four axes that 
are controversial in Eastern European transition. 
Three Czech laws together create a comprehensive program of 
restitution.32 All three laws codify a preference for "natural" resti-
tution, which gives property back to its "original" owner.33 When 
the property's value increased significantly during communist pos-
session, however, monetary compensation is sometimes awarded, 
equivalent to fair market value at the time of expropriation.34 This 
alternative is subject to strict monetary caps on the cash any single 
claimant may receive, the balance being paid in riskier state securi-
ties.35 For the most part, not surprisingly, most nonagricultural 
30. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 359-60 ("[R]emarkably few figures are available to 
gauge the cost of restitution in the Czech Republic."). The figure of $10 billion is often 
quoted, but not verified. See id. 
31. See, e.g., Janet Guyon, Noble Rot: As the Czechs Return Confiscated Property, Real 
Estate Languishes, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, May 6, 1993, at 1 (33-year-old banker in Monte 
Carlo, who had never been to Czechoslovakia, became a Czech prince through his father's 
restitution claims); Kitty McKinsey, Bata Shows You Can Go Home Again: 56 Years After 
Fleeing, Shoe King Is Inspiration in Land of His Birth, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 21, 1994, at D4; 
Marjorie Miller, Noble Try to Reclaim Heritage, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1994, at 1A (80-year-old 
Joseph Kinsky, who regained his castle after years working in communist uranium mines); 
Shailagh Murray, Real Estate: Prague Property Prices a Case for Kafka, WALL ST. J. 
EUROPE, Jan. 31, 1994, at 36; Hannah Rothschild, Coming Home, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar. 
12, 1994, at 38 ("[A family friend] lost everything in 1948. He went to live in a woodman's 
cottage and got a job driving trucks for a former employee. Last year, at the age of 74, he got 
his estates back. His boss was heard to say, 'I have lost my best driver but at least I've got my 
best landlord back."'). 
32. The Small Restitution Law, enacted in 1989, restores private residences, small busi-
nesses, stores, and workshops expropriated between 1955 and 1959. See, e.g., Burger, supra 
note 22, at 486; Renzulli, supra note 22, at 178. The second law, the so-called Large Restitu-
tion Law, was enacted in 1991 and provides restitution for most other, larger property expro-
priated after 1948 and not covered by the Small Restitution Law. See, e.g., Burger, supra 
note 22, at 486; Gelpern, supra note 22, at 336. Fmally, agricultural land is restored under a 
different regime codified by the Federal Land Law. Because agriculture was one of the few 
economic sectors to perform better than disastrously under communist rule, the Czech gov-
ernment was loath to disaggregate productive collective farms and threaten the nation's food 
production. See Burger, supra note 22, at 487. 
33. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 239-40; see also Burger, supra note 22, at 485-86 ("The 
concept of returning tangible real or personal property to rightful owners or their heirs seems 
at first sight simple enough .... The lapse of forty years, after all, was not long enough to 
have erased memories of who had owned what. Nor were the public records, albeit modified 
by the Marxists, rendered useless for identifying lawful owners of properties as recorded 
before the ... 1948 coup."). 
34. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 242. 
35. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 338. ("Cash compensation under the Large ... Resti-
tution Law may not exceed ... about $1,000"). 
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property decreased in value during communism and "[m]any of the 
properties are returned in poor condition or beyond repair from 
years of neglect. "36 . 
As with all restitutionary schemes in Eastern Europe, the Czech 
program met with substantial internal political resistance. Three 
principal objections were frequently voiced. First, the laws only 
cover property that was expropriated between the start of the com-
munist regime in 1948 and its end in 1989 and thus exclude Jewish 
claims for property seized by the Nazis and claims by Sudeten 
Germans for property seized after the war by the Czechs.37 Second, 
the Czech program excludes foreigners and even Czech nationals 
living abroad from claiming restitution.38 This decision has gener-
ated controversy within expatriate Czech communities as it severely 
limits the scope of the restitutionary claims that might otherwise be 
available.39 
Ultimately, however, the most salient objection is to the form of 
restitution; restoring property in kind comes with efficiency and dis-
tributional consequences. Many political actors argued for privatiz-
ing property instead by selling it to the highest bidder.40 Selling the 
resources would be relatively more likely to transfer assets to peo-
ple motivated to use them effectively without muddying title. 
Privatization sale proceeds would simultaneously give the bankrupt 
new government resources to fund crucial programs - such as im-
proving infrastructure and coping with emerging environmental di-
sasters - or for making restitution.41 
Nevertheless, restitution went forward on the massive scale 
originally contemplated. The complex implementation of Czech 
restitution has even taken priority over the slow process towards 
privatization.42 Commentators have alternatively charged natural 
restitution with both economic catastrophe43 and fiscal salvation for 
36. Crowder, supra note 22, at 254; see also Neff, supra note 22, at 369. 
37. See Stack, supra note 22, at 1242; Crowder, supra note 22, at 242-43; Robert 
Hochstein, Note, Jewish Property Restitution in the Czech Republic, 19 B.C.INn.. & COMPo L. 
REv. 423, 423 (1997). 
38. See Renzulli, supra note 22, at 178-81; Stack, supra note 22, at 1242-43. But see Neff, 
supra note 22, at 372 (arguing that the restriction may be less prohibitive than some Czech 
expatriates believe). 
39. See Neff, supra note 22, at 372. 
40. See id. at 370. 
41. See Banker & Offe, supra note 22, at 48. 
42. See Neff, supra note 22, at 370. 
43. See, e.g., Gelpem, supra note 22, at 325-26 (" 'Arguments that an extensive restitution 
of property in kind is the fastest form of privatization is [sic] a fiction .... Instead of speeding 
up privatization, it would actually slow it down and prolong it perhaps for decades.'" (quot-
ing BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, 
BBCSWB File)); Crowder, supra note 22, at 252-56 (describing the "problems resulting from 
restitution in kind"). 
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the Czech Republic.44 All, however, appear to agree that natural 
restitution signals a strong commitment to protecting private prop-
erty.45 The Czech Republic's comprehensive program is often con-
trasted with Hungary's more limited restitutionary policies.46 
2. Restitution in Hungary 
Hungary took a substantially different path from the Czech 
Republic. Often described as "limited" compensation, Hungarian 
restitution provides no natural restitution but instead pays fixed 
rates for property taken by the communists.47 The fixed values ap-
plied to property usually restore only a token percentage of the 
property's actual value. Claims up to $2,300 are compensated in 
full; the next $1,150 are compensated 50%; the next $2,300 get 30%; 
and amounts above these totals get 10% up to a maximum compen-
sation of about $57,000.48 
Hungarian restitution is not "limited" merely because of the un-
dervaluation of restorable property. The form of the restitution, 
too, is more restricted than in the Czech Republic. Instead of cash, 
the Hungarian government pays original owners their compensa-
tion in state-created coupons.49 While these coupons are freely 
tradable securities, they are not fully liquid for five years and are 
intended to be used to repurchase state-owned property.50 The 
modest Hungarian goal is "partial indemnification, not reprivatiza-
tion."51 Although early versions of the restitution laws allowed 
farmers to use their coupons to redeem their pre communist land 
holdings, the Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down this pro-
vision on the grounds that "it discriminated against former owners 
44. See, e.g., Neff, supra note 22, at 369-70 (describing the economic success of Czech 
restitution resulting from its comprehensive protection of property ownership). 
45. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 318 (calling the Czech program "all-out restitution"); 
Neff, supra note 22, at 369. 
46. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 316; Banker & Offe, supra note 22, at 11-12. 
47. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 328 ("Hungary's limited compensation program re-
flects an atypical influence of the technocrats in its post-socialist politics .... "). Gelpern may 
overstate the significance of the political factors: initial restitution laws in Hungary provided 
for natural restitution. 
48. See Gray et aI., supra note 6, at 309; see also Gelpern, supra note 22, at 344; Neff, 
supra note 22, at 373-74. The scale incorporates a complicated set of valuation guidelines: 
"For non-agricultural real estate, compensation is measured in proportion to the area ..• 
depending on the present location. Classifications include Budapest, provincial towns, vil-
lages and vacant lots outside any of the enumerated areas." Gelpern, supra note 22, at 344. 
Equally specific guidelines determine the restitutable value of corporations depending on the 
size of the workforce employed at the time of the expropriation. See id. 
49. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 344-46. 
50. See Neff, supra note 22, at 374. 
51. ld. at 376. Again, "reprivatization" means "restitution" in the transition literature. 
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of urban and industrial property, who were not given the possibility 
of natural restitution."52 
On the other hand, Hungarian restitution is broader than its 
Czech counterpart in two interesting respects: first, it reaches back 
to 1939 so it covers Nazi expropriations of Jews; and second, restitu-
tion can be granted to nonnationals and nonresidents.53 Given its 
other restrictions, these looser requirements may seem surprising. 
These factors have not, however, resulted in the anticipated flood 
of restitutionary claims. The Hungarian National Compensation 
Office, operating out of a former brothel, has needed to extend 
deadlines for filing claims several times for apparent lack of interest 
in the program.54 As of 1996, five years after Hungary's original 
restitution law was enacted, only seventy-five percent of restitution 
coupons had been issued, with a face value of approximately $650 
million.55 This is dramatically less than the two to four billion dol-
lar price tag originally anticipated.56 Hungary's restitution has pro-
ceeded on a much smaller scale than its Czech neighbors' program. 
C. Gaps in the Existing Literature 
1. Why Restitute Property At All? 
Facing substantial political opposition, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary nevertheless persevered with restitutionary programs. 
The short-term economic cost of restitution has been high, hardly a 
surprise. In particular, natural restitution overburdens weak new 
legal institutions because of problems associated with unclear title, 
the condition of the property being returned, and the creation of 
numerous wrenching conflicts between current and former own-
ers.57 Even the Hungarian program creates a substantial legal and 
administrative headache. The best reasoning counsels against resti-
tution at all. As Jon Elster has written: 
It is important to keep in mind that essentially everybody suffered 
under Communism. Whereas some lost their property, others -
many others - had opportunities denied to them through the arbi-
trary or tyrannical behavior of the authorities .... It would be arbi-
52. See Gray et al., supra note 6, at 309 n.ll1; see also Peter Paczolay, Judicial Review of 
the Compensation Law in Hungary, 13 MICH. J.1NrL. L. 806, 813-17 (1992); Benker & Offe, 
supra note 22, at 34 ("It took three decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court to limit 
the preferential treatment for land. According to the first draft of the ... law, expropriated 
land would have been given back, whereas other kinds of confiscated property would have 
been only compensated."). 
53. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 343, 347. 
54. See id. at 348, 363. 
55. See European Bank for Reconstruction & Development, Transition Report 6 (Nov. 3, 
1997), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 18308670. 
56. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 363. 
57. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 249-57. 
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trary and wrong to single out one group of victims - the owners of 
tangible property - for compensation .... Property rights are, in my 
opinion, among the least rather than most inviolable rights. Those 
protecting individual dignity, autonomy, and privacy are much more 
central .... Full compensation to some of the victims cannot be de-
fended as a second-best approximation to the ideal of universal com-
pensation, if that ideal itself is meaningless. 58 
Given these arguments, why restitution? Some commentators 
have suggested that long-term economic gains may offset any cur-
rent economic slowdown.59 Restitution is undoubtedly a "tech-
nique to build a private economY,"60 at least in part. It may serve as 
a signaling mechanism to Western investors that their investments 
will be protected - "restitution enhances the credibility of eco-
nomic reform by demonstrating the government's belief in the vir-
tues of private property."61 Also, it transfers resources to former 
owners who may then trade them to more productive users than 
socialist owners. The complexity of large-scale restitution, how-
ever, weakens the efficiency point just as Elster's arguments under-
mine justice claims. In the Czech case, the commitment to natural 
restitution is perplexing. Full monetary recovery is as strong a sig-
naling mechanism, but it would permit the current government to 
sell land to the highest bidder and create clear title.62 
Economic policy can perhaps help explain Hungary's more lim-
ited program of restitution. The country began transition with a 
heavy debt load and, perhaps, could not afford to restore as much 
as its neighbors.63 Why, though, if fiscal constraints were of such 
concern, would Hungary have expanded the group of people eligi-
ble for restitution to include foreigners? Perhaps Hungary made a 
sophisticated decision to adopt a modest program for all, while the 
Czechs decided on more comprehensive restitution for native 
Czechs alone. But this distinction only begs the question of why a 
58. Jon Elster, On Doing What One Can: An Argument Against Post-Communist Restitu-
tion and Retribution, E. EUR. CONST. REv., Summer 1992, at 15,16-17. Other commentators 
have explored restitution through the lens of moral duty. See Offe, supra note 7, at 43 
("[T]he moral objection may be raised that it is unfair that, within the universe of victims of 
the old regime, the subset of expropriated owners o/productive assets alone can [claim restitu-
tion]."). After analyzing the legitimacy of the original expropriations according to both de-
ontological and consequentialist standards, Bonker and Offe conclude that moral arguments 
cannot justify restitution. See Bonker & Offe, supra note 22, at 47. 
59. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 262 ("[p]roviding the Czechs with some sense of jus-
tice for the egregious wrongs committed by the communists appears to be a necessary step to 
growing the cause of democracy and economic reform. Not taking this step might have re-
sulted in a much worse long range outcome for the Czechs."). 
60. Bonker & Offe, supra note 22, at 11. 
61. [d. at 21; see also Crowder, supra note 22, at 240, 250. 
62. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 257-58 (objecting to natural restitution because of its 
inefficiency). 
63. See Gelpero, supra note 22, at 330. 
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country would prefer one approach to another. The difference be-
tween the Hungarian and Czech programs reflects more than the 
depth of their respective pockets. Both were broke. While eco-
nomic interests must surely be motivating some of the choices in 
the restitutionary movement, they carniot provide a fully satisfying 
story and do not adequately explain restitution's various contours 
across resources, even in the two neighboring countries we are 
considering. 
2. Why Natural Restitution? 
Full restitution of economic value seems unlikely enough, but 
returning specific plots of land to their owners from half a century 
ago seems incredible. Two plausible justifications have been given 
for natural restitution. In the first days of transition, only discred-
ited former communists had sufficient resources to purchase prop-
erty sold on the market. Natural restitution was an expensive 
attempt to keep the property out of their hands (and even more 
crucially for the Czechs, a way to keep property away from poten-
tial German buyers).64 Natural restitution, however, may not have 
been up to this task. Because of the level of disrepair of most real 
property, many entitled owners refused to file restitutionary claims. 
The result has sometimes been the transfer of vast quantities of 
land to outsiders - the only people who can afford to maintain the 
property.65 Natural restitution may be largely motivated by a de-
sire to keep property out of ex-communist and German hands, but 
its effects are conflicting at best and counterproductive at worst. 
Natural restitution remains intuitively appealing in a manner 
not captured by economic concerns - putting an elderly widow (or 
more likely, her heirs) back in her childhood apartment, the one 
she has longingly walked by for five decades. Somehow, then, resti-
tution participates in a moment of personal and cultural definition. 
When a country signals its change to a new regime, it sends a 
message to its own citizens, at least as much as to foreign investors. 
Yes, restoring property indicates a renewed commitment to private 
ownership, but it also distinguishes the new regime's commitments 
from its communist predecessors' illegitimacy. 
64. See It Still Hurts, THE ECONOMIST, May 21, 1994, at 58 (noting that Vaclav Havel, the 
Czech President, was "adamantly opposed to compensation" for the 2.5 million Sudeten 
Germans expelled at the end of WWII); see also Offe, supra note 7, at 42 n.59. 
65. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 254-55. "George Lobkowicz, a European banker who 
had never been to Czechoslovakia, recently became a Czech prince, and his family became 
one of the country's biggest landowners as a result of the restitution laws." Id. at 255. 
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Restitution has sometimes been cast in terms of "national re-
birth and 'moral purification,' "66 an attitude that may explain the 
preference for natural citizens and the precision with which govern-
ments choose the dates for restorable expropriations. Limiting the 
class of people eligible to claim restitution helps create a mythical 
cultural identity; it serves as a tacit statement about who counts as 
"real" Czechs or Hungarians in these newly emerging states.67 
Shlomo Avineri noticed that most former socialist countries, includ-
ing the Czech Republic, chose cut off dates for restitution that coin-
cided with the most ethnically pure moment in the country's 
history.68 In the Czech case, this was just after the Nazis had mur-
dered the centuries-old Jewish community, and the Czechs had bru-
tally expelled an equally rooted German community.69 Similarly, 
the Lithuanians chose the moment when the Jews and the Poles had 
been murdered and kicked out;70 the Poles when the Jews, 
Germans, and Russians were gone;71 and so on. Restitution, then, 
serves as part of national myth making, linking people to an 
imagined (or hoped for), ethnically pure past; that is, linking to-
day's citizens to the "natural" owners of national private property. 
Avineri's understanding of restitution leads us nicely into 
Dagan's framework. What myth is a country creating or evidencing 
through its restitutionary scheme? If restitution does not result 
only from contingent political and economic facts,72 then Dagan's 
theory suggests that each country's program may embody impor-
tant - and importantly different - socioeconomic characteristics. 
Identifying these differences opens another level of subtlety 
through which to understand postsocialist societies. 
66. Gelpern, supra note 22, at 323 (borrowing terminology from Vratislav Pechota, Priva-
tization and Foreign Investment in Czechoslovakia: The Legal Dimension, 24 V AND. J. 
TRANSNA1L. L. 305, 308 (1991». 
67. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 356 ("All of the reprivatization initiatives generally 
bypass or subordinate the claims of ethnic minorities, most of which had been expropriated 
in succession prior to the relevant cut-off dates .... "). 
68. Shlomo Avineri, Lecture at the Conference on Restitution in Eastern Europe, 
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary (June 18-19, 1993). 
69. See Stephen A. Denburg, Note, Reclaiming Their Past: A Survey of Jewish Efforts to 
Restitute European Property, 18 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 233, 256-57 (1998). 
70. See William Valletta, The Hesitant Privatization of Lithuanian Land, 18 FORDHAM 
INn.. LJ. 198,203-04 (1994) (linIiting restitution to current citizens willing to farm the land). 
71. See William R. Youngblood, Note, Poland's Struggle for a Restitution Policy in tlte 
1990s, 9 EMORY INn.. L. REv. 645, 646 (1995). 
72. For example, we are assuming that Hungary's linIited restitutionary program was a 
result of more than the poor showing of its prorestitution party at the polls. See Offe, supra 
note 7, at 26-27; Gelpern, supra note 22, at 318 (arguing that "the likelihood of passing strong 
restitution measures varies inversely with the strength of the left and the technocrats in the 
political arena" which in tum depends on "the manner of each country's transition from state 
socialism."). There should be an interesting story to tell beyond these political accidents. 
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D. Postsocialist Restitution Through the Dagan Prism 
What can Dagan's approach tell us about the Czechs and 
Hungarians? And what do their experiences tell us about his the-
ory? Dagan's framework suggests we look for messages hidden in 
postsocialist restitution programs. Interpreting these messages re-
quires some work. The remainder of this review is a tentative first 
step. 
1. Of Control and Well-Being 
First, consider natural restitution. To the Czechs, it may signal 
condemnation of certain expropriations and a commitment to par-
ticular victims of communism; to outsiders, it may signal a better 
investment climate with renewed respect for private property.73 In-
tuitively, natural restitution seems like a strong commitment to in-
dividualliberty and a rejection of sharing through forced transfers. 
It appears to stand in sharp contrast to Hungary's limited compen-
sation. This preliminary conclusion may be too simple, however. 
In Dagan's hierarchy of restitutionary values, return of the run-
down original property does not vindicate either the original 
owner's control or her well-being. What is going on? 
According to Dagan's translation scheme, restitutionary reme-
dies that vindicate control do so by removing a potential expropria-
tor's ex ante incentives to take property unjustly. Natural 
restitution fails this test. According to the Czech program, commu-
nist expropriators return property only when it makes them no 
worse off than before the taking. In the rare cases when the com-
munists increased the property's value, the original owner does not 
benefit.74 Dagan would term the unusual rationale motivating this 
system "well-being or control"; it permits recovery of only the lesser 
of fair market value and profits and is rarely used. Dagan notes, 
[T]he well-being or control rationale reverses forced transfers only in 
so far as the remedy does not diminish the defendant'S ex ante level of 
welfare. This creates an incentive effect of encouraging forced trans-
fers .... [which] not only encourages efficient transfers, but encour-
ages all transfers indiscriminately. This may be the reason why the 
well-being or control rationale is not evident in any case or statute 
covered by this book. It can thus be safely omitted from our transla-
tion scheme. [po 21] 
73. See Bonker & Offe, supra note 22, at 2l. 
74. See Neff, supra note 22, at 369 (describing the Czech law that requires original owners 
of the rare property that has increased in value to remit the difference to the expropriator). 
The Large Restitution Law, however, may be ambiguous in its treatment of property that has 
increased in value. The relevant baseline may be the date when the Law went into effect and 
not the date of the original expropriation. Under this interpretation, the original owner is 
only responsible for compensating increases in value since 1991 when the Large Restitution 
Law was enacted. See Gelpem, supra note 22, at 338 n.8l. 
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Dagan omits the rationale too quickly. Maybe it is missing from 
stable market economies, but Czechs, among others, have chosen 
this as their focus for restitution. Natural restitution sends a 
message: not of the vindication of personhood through protection 
of property, but nearly the opposite, that the communists could 
gamble with your land and then, when they lost, return it to you in 
shambles. In the Czech Republic, the property returned is often 
more of a liability than an asset, property the state willingly gives 
back.75 
By offering a percentage of the property's fair market value up 
to a fixed ceiling, Hungary also adopts an ex post level of recovery 
that reinforces the ex ante incentive to expropriate. Hungary's sys-
tem is based on the rationale of well-being. It aims to restore the 
original owner to some fixed percentage of her ex ante level of 
wealth. While this is not precisely a valuation scheme that Dagan 
considers, the remedy suggests to future expropriators that they 
have little to fear from this method of restitution. Expropriators 
have effectively been granted an entitlement to use the property, 
while being called on to restitute only a fixed and minimal percent-
age of its actual value. The Hungarian system, however, includes 
the following caveat: the fair market value of property valued at 
less than $2,300 is restored in full. For smaller property, then, 
Hungary's purportedly limited restitution is even stronger than 
Czech natural restitution; in Hungary, people's well-being is fully 
vindicated with respect to their smaller and perhaps more personal 
assets. This is indeed a surprising result. 
Viewed in Dagan's terms, the Czech and Hungarian transition 
programs no longer seem to fall on opposite sides of the restitution-
ary spectrum. Both countries are enacting limited property protec-
tion that may reinforce the perverse incentive to expropriate. The 
sharpest contrast in restitutionary approaches, then, is not between 
natural and monetary restitution.76 Rather, both programs stand 
together in contradistinction to other programs, such as that en-
acted in the former East Germany, in which the government re-
stores either the property itself or its current fair market value, 
75. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 254. The property is not returned free and clear. 
Already dilapidated buildings may have tenants who cannot be evicted and for whom basic 
services must continue to be provided. "Protective rent controls place owners in a precarious 
situation by not allowing rent increases to keep pace with maintenance costs." Id. at 256. 
76. This, despite commentators' implicit assumptions to the contrary. See, e.g., Gelpern, 
supra note 22, at 316 ("At the other end of the spectrum [from the Czech Republic], Hungary 
has granted former owners near-nominal compensation in capital vouchers."); Youngblood, 
supra note 71, at 645 ("[Restitutionary programs] range from no restitution to the return of 
all property taken by the former government."); Banker & Offe, supra note 22, at 11-12. 
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whichever the original owner prefers.77 Germany's "well-being and 
control" remedy - also applied to the most protected resources in 
American restitution law - removes ex ante incentives for future 
expropriators to take property unjustly by restoring the greater of 
fair market value and profits. The Czech Republic and Hungary 
provide no such disincentive. 
Dagan's approach has already provided a powerful and counter-
intuitive insight: rules valuing restitution may reveal normative po-
sitions even more clearly than do rules on the physical form of 
recovery. 
2. Eastern Europe and the "Personhood" of Property 
What does the general decision to vindicate well-being or con-
trol tell us about underlying social values? Here, Dagan's frame-
work is indeterminate but still useful. The Czech and Hungarian 
laws may be able tell a story about their relationships with particu-
lar restituted resources, or they may equally well reflect each coun-
try's socioeconomic ethos. 
Within the Czech Republic, restitution's political success was 
tied to the personal significance of the resource at issue. For exam-
ple, passage of the Small Restitution Law can be explained, in part, 
because the law "returned small property of greater personal signif-
icance to a larger number of people than did the subsequent 
laws."78 As Czech policy moved away from core resources, opposi-
tion increased. Even within a general framework of limited natural 
restitution, the Czechs created a hierarchy similar to the one Dagan 
reports in the American legal context. While the restitutionary 
remedy does not vary across resources in the Czech Republic -
natural restitution is exclusively favored - differing political reac-
tions to the various stages of restitution strengthen Dagan's claim 
that the rules reflect a people's relationship to different resources. 
Looking to the personhood quotient of a resource opens a new 
way of perceiving Hungarian restitution. Instead of a mere eco-
nomic necessity, Hungarians' sliding scale grants greater protection 
to items of smaller economic value but perhaps more personal 
meaning. By giving full fair market value for smaller losses, the 
Hungarians vindicate the most acute interests people had, not in 
great concentrations of wealth, but in ordinary things like the fam-
ily apartment. Dagan's framework helps explain, and perhaps jus-
tify, Hungary's approach. 
77. See Rainer Frank, Privatization in Eastern Germany: A Comprehensive Study, 27 
V AND. J. TRANSNATI.. L. 809, 833 (1994). This principle is subject to several important ex-
ceptions that limit natural restitution. See id. at 833-38. 
78. Gelpem, supra note 22, at 327. 
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3. The Ethos of Expropriation 
The personhood quotient of a resource is only one side of 
Dagan's analytical coin. Flipping now to the other, each country's 
social ethos may also make its respective restitutionary programs 
more intelligible. The restitutionary rules reflect how people today 
understand the legitimacy of the original expropriation. Countries 
that judge the communists more harshly now may place more em-
phasis on higher restitutionary awards, to the extent they can afford 
them.79 Both the Czechs and the Hungarians suffered communist 
rule and Soviet invasion, and today both go to considerable lengths 
to distinguish themselves from their political predecessors. 
A generation of communist rule could have plausibly affected 
each country's sharing ethos - an ethos shift that may be reflected 
in its restitutionary awards.80 Dagan does not explore this issue in 
his case studies; rather, he takes the ethos as a given, an exogenous 
rather than endogenous variable in restitution programs. Contrast, 
for example, East Germany's socialist regime, "where small busi-
ness presence was tolerated in manufacturing and service sectors, 
[with] the Czechoslovakian Communist government [that] national-
ized practically all business to the sta~e or operated these business 
in the form of cooperatives. "81 Did more intensive socialist rules 
shift attitudes so that people became less invested in particular ma-
terial resour,ces? 
The original Czech expropriation was on an enormous scale: 
"since 1945, the Czech lands had undergone the largest-scale na-
tionalization in the region."82 Whether this reflected a preexisting 
national view of sharing or marked a radical shift, communal own-
ership was ubiquitous by the time the communist regime fell. The 
Czech's aggressive attack on private property perhaps created - or 
did it reflect? - a willingness to permit forced transfers of re-
sources. In turn, perhaps this willingness can begin to explain why 
Czech restitution protects only well-being or control, while East 
Germany protects well-being and control. In other words, the form 
of restitution may teach us that Czechs had more tolerance for com-
79. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 330 ("[T]he extent of compensation can be only as 
great as the country's load-bearing capacity permits." (quoting speech by Imre Konya, parlia-
mentary leader for the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Political Parties in Brief, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB 
File)). 
80. The communist government in Czechoslovakia engaged in systematic efforts to eradi-
cate almost all forms of private ownership. For over 40 years, then, Czech citizens were 
indoctrinated into communal ownership and the government's right to collectivize people's 
land and expropriate their property. See Renzulli, supra note 22, at 170-74. 
81. Neff, supra note 22, at 370. 
82. Gelpern, supra note 22, at 324-25; see also Crowder, supra note 22, at 240 ("You can't 
understand the scope of the challenge ... until you realize that here we don't own anything 
other than our toothbrushes."). 
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munist nationalization than did the Germans, whose restitution 
programs reflect more complete rejection of communist nationali-
zation. Or maybe East Germans just had richer patrons - Dagan's 
theory is not really designed to help us distinguish these cases. 
The cutoff dates for restitution may also give some insight into 
national ethoses, beyond the symbolic myth-making role we have 
already discussed.83 Immediately after World War II, the Soviets 
expropriated land in East Germany that is not being restituted now. 
This results partly from the deal the Soviets made when they left 
Germany in 1989, but also from a sense of the legitimacy of the 
initial Soviet actions punishing the Nazis and breaking up feudal 
estates of the discredited Junker class.84 Similarly, in the Czech 
Republic, "[t]he intensity and breadth of opposition to the Czech 
Restitution Law [with an earlier recovery date] is evidence of popu-
lar belief in the justice of these post-war expropriations, and the 
persistent assumption of the collective guilt of Germans."85 The 
perceived legitimacy of the original expropriation affected the resti-
tution debate.86 Dagan's approach focuses on a national ethos of 
sharing versus individualism, but the postsocialist experience shows 
that this variable is itself responsive to historical events. 
More bluntly, people seem more sharing-oriented when their 
government is sharing around a disfavored group's property. In 
other words, when designing restitution laws people ask (and com-
mentators should ponder): sharing with whom? It is not only the 
quantum of personhood invested in a resource that matters, but 
whose resource is at stake. Perhaps a restitution program reflects 
the innocuous judgment that heirs and distant generations have less 
personhood wrapped up in a piece of property than living and pres-
ent citizens. More invidiously, the idea of sharing can be used to 
exclude disfavored groups from c1airning restitution. 
Recognizing that sharing orientation depends in part on the so-
cial status of the original owner also explains limitations on who can 
file restitutionary claims. Why exclude Czech citizens living 
abroad? Why not permit foreigners to recover property? The sim-
ple answer is that the Czech Republic has come to view their 
precommunist expropriations as relatively legitimate, by contrast 
with Hungary, which has not. 
83. See supra section III.C.2. 
84. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 243; Stack, supra note 22, at 1221-22. 
85. Gelpem, supra note 22, at 327-28. 
86. See, e.g., Youngblood, supra note 71, at 646 (discussing Poland's proposed restitution-
ary plan which distinguishes between property taken by the Polish government and property 
taken by the Communists, claiming that "the latter is merely a cost of war," and distinguish-
ing between property taken pursuant to communist law and property taken outside the law.). 
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We . find ourselves surprised to describe the Czech Republic, 
with its nationalistic, natural restitution approach, as perhaps more 
sharing-oriented than Hungary with its limited cash vouchers. The 
details of the programs, though, help qualify our understanding of 
each national ethos. Compared with the Czechs, the Hungarians 
evidence a relatively stronger individualist ethos by reaching back 
to 1939 and they demonstrate a less nationalistic version of the 
sharing ethos by restituting limited resources to a wide community. 
The ethos of sharing, which seems to have a warm and fuzzy aspect 
in Dagan's Talmudic story, reveals a nationalistic and exclusive un-
dertone when run through the Eastern European example. 
Thinking about the Czechs sent us back to our Talmudic sources 
(rather, we cadged advice from those who know). Apparently, the 
Talmud would not distinguish in Dagan's core example between the 
Jewish and Gentile squatter; neither would owe restitution to the 
landowner. Elsewhere, however, Talmudic law differentiates 
sharply the obligations Jews owe to each other and to non-Jews.87 
The Talmud may require sharing within the group, but not with out-
siders. In the Talmud, as in Eastern Europe, attitudes toward shar-
ing tum out to be complex and contextual, dependent as much on 
the definition of community as on the personhood of resources. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Dagan offers a useful new tool for thinking about comparative 
law. Rather than losing ourselves in technicalities, an occupational 
hazard that drives comparative scholars to abandon the field, 
Dagan shows how we can extract the social values embedded in the 
private law. Using his method, we can parse the core social values 
hidden in any area of law. The technicalities of unjust enrichment 
reveal compelling stories about property, personhood, and national 
ethos. When put to a practical test, Dagan's approach opens a win-
dow on the frenzy of restitution across the former socialist world, 
an issue of practical and political significance that has received 
almost no theoretical attention. Dagan provides the intellectual 
tools we need to start the job. 
87. See, e.g., Steven D. Fraade, Navigating the Anomalous: Non-Jews at the Intersection of 
Early Rabbinic Law and Narrative, in THE OniER IN JEWISH THOUGHT AND HISTORY 145, 
147-58 (Laurence J. Silberstein & Robert L. Cohn eds., 1994). For example, Fraade analyzes 
a passage from the Mishnah which discusses the remedy for one ox goring another ox. If 
both oxen belonged to Jews, the live one was to be sold and its profits divided between both 
owners - a sharing rule. However, if a non-Jew's ox was gored, no compensation was due, 
and if the ox of a non-Jew gored the ox of a Jew, full compensation had to be paid - a 
damages rule imposed against outsiders. Id. at 147. Though Talmudic interpretations of obli-
gations owed to non-Jews have evolved since medieval times, disparate treatment continues 
to trouble interpreters. See generally JACOB KATZ, EXCLUSrvENESS AND TOLERANCE (1961) 
(examining the complex and reciprocal evolution of Jewish and Gentile attitudes toward each 
other); DAVID NOVAK, JEWISH-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE 26 (1989) (emphasizing the Noahide 
Laws which form "the rubric for the formulation of Jewish views of non-Jews"). 
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INTRODUCTION: THE GENERATIONAL SHIFT IN 
CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP 
When I teach the doctrine of good faith performance, I assign 
an exchange between two distinguished contracts scholars, Robert 
Summers and Steven Burton, that has come t6 be known as the 
"Summers-Burton" debate.1 This debate is interesting not only for 
the contrasting views of its protagonists concerning the doctrine of 
good faith, but also because of the generational shift in modes of 
scholarship it represents. " 
In the 1950s and 1960s, contracts scholars, like so many others, 
rejected so-called "conceptualist" or "formalist" approaches that 
attempted to dictate the outcome of cases with general concepts 
and rules. Contracts scholarship was dominated by supposedly "re-
alist" inquiries into the complexities of actual commercial practice, 
inquiries which sought to identify the multiple factors or considera-
tions that judges do or should take into account when deciding 
cases. Usually it was denied that these factors could or should be 
weighted or organized in some manner in advance of a legal dis-
pute. Any effort to reduce the vast complexity of the real world of 
commercial practice to some verbal formula was dismissed as "re-
ductionist" or "simplistic." 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "reductionist" as: "An 
advocate of reductionism; one who attempts to analyse or account 
for a complex theory or phenomenon by reduction."2 And it de-
fines "simplistic" as: "Of the nature of, or characterized by, (ex-
treme) simplicity. Now usu[ally] with the connotation of excessive 
or misleading simplification."3 An 1881 example of the word's us-
age captures the "realist" spirit that eventually captured the imagi-
* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law. B.A. 1974, 
Northwestern; J.D. 1977, Harvard. rbarnett@bu.edu - Ed. 
1. See RANDy E. BARNETT, PERSPECI'IVES ON CONTRACT LAW 250-67 (1995). 
2. 13 OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 437 (2d ed. 1989). 
3. 15 id. at 501. 
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nation of legal scholars: "The facts of nature and of life are more 
apt to be complex than simple. Simplistic theories are generally 
one-sided and partial."4 
Professor Summers is of the generation of legal academics that 
was taught by the vanguard of "realisf' professors - a generation 
that took their teachers' gestalt and terminology to heart. For ex-
ample, to explain the implied duty of good faith performance in his 
seminal 1968 article, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the 
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,s Summers pro-
posed a series of six categories of bad faith performance: (a) eva-
sion of the spirit of the deal, (b) lack of diligence and slacking off, 
(c) willfully rendering only "substantial performance," (d) abuse of 
a power to specify contract terms, ( e) abuse of a power to deter-
mine compliance, and (f) interfering with or failing to cooperate in 
the other party's performance.6 In terms that embody the spirit of 
the realist generation (and of those whom the realists taught), Sum-
mers explicitly denied that any more general conception of good 
faith was helpful or even possible: 
It is submitted that any but the most vacuous general definition of 
good faith will ... fail to cover all the many and varied specific mean-
ings that it is possible to assign to the phrase in light of the many and 
varied forms of bad faith recognized in the cases .... 
. . . [G]eneral definitions of good faith either spiral into the Cha-
rybdis of vacuous generality or collide with the Scylla of restrictive 
specificity.7 
A judge, he advised, "should not waste effort formulating his own 
reductionist definitions. Instead, he should characterize with care 
the particular forms of bad faith he chooses to rule out . . .. "8 
In the 1970s and 1980s, this attitude toward scholarship began to 
change. Legal scholarship shifted away from realist modes toward 
what came to be called "legal theory." Contracts scholarship, like 
other fields, came to be dominated by scholars who risked the epi-
thets of '~reductionist" and "simplistic" in search of unifying theo-
ries of legal doctrine. For reasons I have elaborated elsewhere,9 I 
attribute this generational shift initially to the rise of law and eco-
nomics - which directly responded to the consequentialist or "pol-
4. ld. 
5. Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968). 
6. See id. at 232-43. In this same article, Summers also provides five circumstances indio 
cating "bad faith in the negotiation and formation of contracts," id. at 220·32, three instances 
involving "bad faith in raising and resolving contract disputes," id. at 243-48, and four forms 
of "bad faith in taking remedial action," id. at 248-52. 
7. ld. at 206. 
8. ld. at 207. 
9. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 
97 HARv. L. REv. 1223 (1984) (book review). 
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icy" concerns of the realists - and to the subsequent emergence of 
normative legal philosophy that sought to trump the "conservative" 
conclusions of efficiency theorists that many "progressive" legal 
scholars found unpalatable. As a result, scholarship like Robert 
Summers's realist lists of multiple factors that judges, in their dis-
cretion, needed to take "into account," began to give way to more 
systematic theories and approaches. 
One of these was a comprehensive theory of good faith per-
formance developed by Steven Burton, which he presented in his 
1980 article, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per-
form in Good Faith.10 According to Burton, the problem of good 
faith performance arises when a contract gives one party a degree 
of discretion in performing, and this discretion is then used by that 
party to recapture an opportunity foregone at contract formation. 
So to determine whether a party has acted in bad faith, one must 
identify both an opportunity objectively foregone and a subjective 
intention to recapture it. 
Burton contended that without "an operational standard that 
distinguishes good faith performance from bad faith perform-
ance,"ll the general requirement of good faith as contained in the 
Uniform Commercial Code "appears as a license for the exercise of 
judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable 
and inconsistent applications."12 And he specifically took issue 
with Summers's "list of factors" approach: "No effort is made to 
develop a unifying theory that explains what these categories have 
in common. Indeed, the assertion is made that one cannot or 
should not do SO."13 In contrast, Burton argued that "[r]epeated 
common law adjudication, however, has enriched the concept of 
good faith performance so that an operational standard now can be 
articulated and evaluated."14 Burton's theory was based on "a sur-
vey of over 400 cases in which courts explicitly refer to good faith in 
performance:'15 but also on a basic low-tech efficiency analysis.16 
Summers did not remain silent in the face of this challenge, and 
his response was methodological as much as it was substantive: 
My view is that all such efforts to define good faith, for purposes of a 
section like 205, are misguided. Such formulations provide little, if 
10. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach of Contract]; see also Steven 
J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 67 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1981). 
11. Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 10, at 369. 
12. Id. at 369-70 (footnote omitted). 
13. Id. at 369 n.5. 
14. Id. at 370 (footnote omitted). 
15. Id. at 380 n.45. 
16. See id. at 392-94. 
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any, genuine definitional guidance. Moreover, some of them may re-
strictively distort the scope of the general requirement of good 
faith .... Finally, the very idea of good faith, if I am right, is simply 
not the kind of idea that is susceptible of such a definitional 
approach.17 
Substantively, he argued that Burton's two-part inquiry was not 
helpful to deciding cases, that it did not focus on the right things, 
and that it did not go far enough.18 
Burton responded with a thoughtful, and I think persuasive, re-
ply to Summers's critique, in which he characterized the difference 
in their methodologies - the difference that I am calling 
generational: 
We want our language to call our attention to the facts that matter -
those that legitimately establish similarities with or significant differ-
ences from the precedents. . . . We want to know which facts shall 
count for more than their truth because they are legally significant. 
Language can perform this function in a number of ways in addi-
tion to 'positive definitions.' Professor Summers' preference for "lists 
of factors generally relevant to the determination" favors one form 
that could be employed, in theory .... A second form that could be 
employed, however, is the general description or model - a simpli-
fied representation of a complex reality .... Unlike most lists of fac-
tors, the general description technique encourages us to focus on 
complex webs of relationships among the facts.19 
Or, in the words of P.J. O'Rourke: "Complexities are fun to talk 
about, but, when it comes to action, simplicities are often more 
effective. "20 
In drawing attention to a generational shift in modes of scholar-
ship, I do not wish to exaggerate it. Not everyone took the tum to 
unifying theory. Most notable among contracts scholars who did 
not are those associated with the Wisconsin Contracts Group21 and 
those who were attracted to relational theory.22 Nevertheless, both 
of these schools of thought grew out of the influence of two scholars 
who were born within four years of Robert Summers at the begin-
17. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and Concep· 
tualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 829·30 (1982). 
18. See id. at 830·34. 
19. Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to 
Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REv. 497, 509·10 (1984). 
20. P J. O'ROURKE, EAT THE RICH: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 209 (1998); cf. RICH. 
ARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995). 
21. See, e.g., STEWART MACAULAY ET AL.. CoNTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1995). 
22. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 303 (1992). For a summary and critique of communitarian relational theory, see Randy 
E. Barnett, Conflicting VISions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 
VA. L. REv. 1175 (1992). 
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ning of the Great Depression: Stewart Macaulay and Ian 
Macneil.23 
Summers has not been without his own influence, particularly 
on his Cornell Law School colleague and casebook coauthor,24 
Robert Hillman. Hillman, a 1972 graduate of Cornell himself, be-
gan teaching in 1975 at the University of Iowa, where Steven 
Burton arrived two years later in 1977. They taught together for 
five years when, in a career move that starkly symbolizes his choice 
of scholarly models, Hillman left Iowa in 198325 to join the faculty 
of Cornell and his mentor Robert Summers. 
1. HILLMAN'S CRITIQUE OF CONTRACf THEORY 
Over the past twenty-five years, Professor Hillman has made 
many valuable contributions to contracts scholarship,26 but early on 
he expressed his discomfort with what he labeled "modem contract 
theory." In 1988, five years after moving from Iowa to Cornell, he 
published an essay, The Crisis in Modem Contract Theory,27 in 
which he laid out a general critique of unifying theories, and which 
he has now expanded into a book, The Richness of Contract Law. 
The title of Hillman's book is intended to emphasize the fact 
that contract law is far more complex and "rich" than modem uni-
fying contract theories seem to acknowledge: 
Contract law includes a rich combination of normative" approaches 
and theories of obligation. It is divided by special rules for distinct 
kinds of contracts and is subject to many exceptions and counter-
principles. Despite its many dimensions, contract law is a credible, if 
not flawless, reflection of the values of the surrounding society. A 
highly abstract unitary theory illuminates contract law, but it cannot 
explain the entire sphere. [po 6] 
Contract law and theory include contradictions and distinctions. Sub-
ject to competing norms and distinct theories of obligation and to var-
ious exceptions within the main body of doctrine, and divided by 
special rules applying to distinct kinds of contracts, contract law does 
not fit neatly into any slot. A highly abstract core theory simply can-
not account for an entire subject. Instead, contract law is a plausible, if 
23. Summers was born in 1933; Macaulay in 1931; and Macneil in 1929. 
24. See ROBERT s. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CoNTRACT AND RELATED OBLI· 
GATION (2d ed. 1992). 
25. The year after Hillman departed, Eric Anderson joined the Iowa faculty. Anderson's 
subsequent contracts scholarship is clearly in the mold of Steven Burton. See, e.g., Eric An-
derson, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contract, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073 
(1988) (providing a unified theory of material breach). 
26. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: Analysis 
Under Modem Contract Law, 1987 DUKE LJ. 1. I included an excerpt from this article in my 
anthology, Perspectives on Contract Law. See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 357-68. 
27. Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modem Contract Theory, 67 TEXAS L. REv. 103 
(1988). 
HeinOnline -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1418 1998-1999
1418 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1413 
not perfect, reflection of various normative choices of the surrounding 
society. [pp. 273-74; emphasis added, footnotes omitted] 
Throughout the book, Hillman offers a number of useful in-
sights about various issues of contract law and theory - as he has 
in his numerous law review articles - but in this review I shall be 
concerned with his overall theme: a general skepticism about "uni-
fying" or "highly abstract" contract theories that fail to mirror the 
richness of contract law. In this regard, he stands in the "realist" 
tradition of the previous generation of contracts scholars. Hillman 
attempts to justify this stance by examining a number of doctrinal 
contexts: contract formation, unconscionability, and good faith. 
He considers a variety of theoretical approaches: promise theorists, 
reliance theorists, feminist theorists, efficiency theorists, relational 
theorists, and critical legal scholars. 
But though Hillman professes to be concerned with unifying 
contract theories in general, he seems to be primarily troubled by 
theories with which he disagrees. For example, he offers no criti-
cism of feminist theory and, indeed, accepts Mary Joe Frug's char-
acterization of his own analysis as "feminine. "28 After ten pages of 
uncritical summary of contract theories by critical legal scholars, 
Hillman concludes that he finds the "CLS [critical legal studies] in-
determinacy thesis" to be "quite persuasive," though, without elab-
orating, he adds, "[i]n the end, contract law is probably not as 
indeterminate as CLS wants to claim" (p. 209). His critique of rela-
tional theory is similarly tepid, dismissing numerous lengthy pub-
lished criticisms of relationalism, which he dutifully cites,29 with a 
single unsupported sentence: "These criticisms seem to underesti-
mate the judicial capacity to engage in a highly contextual investiga-
tion and to evaluate the relevant relational norms .... " (p. 260) -
though he allows that "one can overstate the conclusions suggested 
by relationalism" (p. 260). 
28. Frug concluded that my approach "neatly fits the popular interpretation of . . . 
virtuous feminine attitudes toward justice" because it "is characterized by a concern for 
multiple objectives, by an appreciation of contextualized relationships, and by a desire to 
achieve flexibility and sharing in the administration of contract remedies." Moreover, 
my analysis "offer[s] a critique of the male model which is both powerful and also remi-
niscent of typical feminine criticisms of masculinity." 
P. 160 (quoting Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist 
Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1036, 1037 (1992) (alterations in 
original)). 
29. He cites the following criticisms of relationalism without identifying where any are 
mistaken (p. 259 nn.82-85): MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CON. 
TRACT 141-42 (1994); Barnett, supra note 22, at 1200; Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, 
Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 142 (1992); 
Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and Economics, 2 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 91, 103, 108, 111 (1993); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Relational Contracts, in 
GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 291 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 
1995). 
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This is, unfortunately, a general tendency of this book. Theories 
with which Professor Hillman appears sympathetic are presented 
with little or no criticism beyond footnote citations to the published 
criticisms of others, whereas he takes to task those theories with 
which he disagrees. Professor Hillman is, of course, well within his 
rights to agree or disagree with particular theories - in short, to 
take sides in a theoretical debate. But this book purports to be 
about the deficiencies of abstract or general contract theory per se, 
which he formerly had referred to as in a "crisis."30 He attempts to 
claim a higher ground than those locked in "theoretical debate" (p. 
7). If that is truly his thesis, then it is only selectively applied. 
Moreover, just as he neglects the richness of published criticisms 
of theories he likes, he overlooks the richness of contract theories 
with which he disagrees. This is evident in his treatment of the ba-
sis of contractual obligation. There, his rhetorical stance is to rise 
above the debate between Grant Gilmore's "death-of-contract" 
thesis and Charles Fried's theory of "contract-as-promise." 
Hillman's argument is that 
neither school has offered a compelling and definitive theory. 
Although based in part on promissory principles, modem contract 
law is also tempered both within and without its formal structure by 
principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment, which focus on 
fairness and the interdependence of parties rather than on parties' 
actual agreements or promises. Contract law is complex, contradic-
tory, and, ultimately, inconclusive on what the relationship of these 
principles is and should be. Moreover, by ignoring or downplaying 
counter-principles and theories, some theorists camouflage contract's 
complexity and hence disguise its true nature. The theoretical debate 
therefore diverts the focus from the reality that promissory and non-
promissory principles share the contract law spotlight, and that this is 
all we can and need to knOW.31 
Throughout the book, Hillman speaks of the complexity of con-
tract law as though anyone with whom he disagrees is unaware of 
this complexity. He does not seem to realize that one function of 
contract theory is to understand and sort out complexity rather than 
merely report it. Another is to assess contending principles and 
"counter-principles and theories" (p. 7), when contract law is "ulti-
mately[] inconclusive on what the relationship of these principles is 
and should be" (p. 7). Still another function is to reshape and im-
prove the law of contract, to move it beyond where it currently re-
sides. Of course, Hillman really does understand all this. His oWn 
writings attempt these very objectives. This is merely an unfortu-
30. See Hillman, supra note 27. 
31. Pp. 7-8 (footnotes omitted). In support of his claim that "some theorists camouflage 
contract's complexity and hence disguise its true nature," Hillman cites Ian Macneil, of 
whose abstract unifying contract theory Hillman offers no criticism. See p. 7 & n.3. 
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nate posture he assumes when speaking of theories with which he 
disagrees. 
For someone concerned with complexities, however, Hillman 
offers what the "realist" generation might call a simplistic and re-
ductionist presentation of the current state of "modem contract 
theory." Grant Gilmore wrote in 1974 and Charles Fried in 1981. 
Hillman's book was published in 1997, though Chapter One closely 
tracks his 1988 essay. In the intervening sixteen years, many others 
have weighed in on these matters. 
In 1986, for example, I offered a "consent theory" of contractual 
obligation that differs from both Gilmore's and Fried's theories,32 
though being closer to the latter than to the former. Far from ig-
noring the fact that "modem contract law is also tempered both 
within and without its formal structure by principles, such as reli-
ance and unjust enrichment, which focus on fairness and the inter-
dependence of parties" (p. 7), I surveyed the "core concerns of 
contract law"33 - "will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, bargain"34 -
and explained how, while each has merit, "none provides a compre-
hensive theory of contractual obligation."35 What is needed, I sug-
gested, is a "framework that specifies when one of these concerns 
should give way to another."36 I proposed the criterion of mani-
fested intention to be legally bound, or "consent," as the best way to 
reconcile the competing demands of these disparate principles.37 
Since then I have elaborated upon this approach,38 and it has been 
32. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 
1022 (1992). 
33. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 271 
(1986). 
34. Id. Later I added "unjust enrichment" to this list. See RANDY E. BARNETI', CON. 
TRAcrs CASES AND DoCI'RINE 637-38 (1995). 
35. Barnett, supra note 33, at 271. 
36. Id. 
37. For a summary of how "consent to be legally bound" accomplishes this integration, 
see BARNETI', supra note 34, at 651-54. 
38. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. & 
POLY. 179 (1986); Randy E. Barnett, ... and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
421 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 
Soc. PHIL. & POLY. 62 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Con· 
cepts, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 525 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and 
Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. 
J.L. & PuB. POLY. 783 (1992); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency With Contract 
Theory, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1987); Randy E. Barnett & Mary Becker, Beyond Reliance: 
Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 445 
(1987). 
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criticized insightfully,39 especially by Richard Craswell.40 While 
nearly all of these articles are cited by Hillman, none are dis-
cussed.41 In writing a book that purports to criticize the endeavor 
of "unifying contract theories," one has an 'obligation to address 
more comprehensively than Hillman does the richness of such theo-
ries, rather than to reduce all of them to either "promise or non-
promissory principles" and cite the existing literature without 
comment. 
True, one could fault, as others have, my attempt to adjudicate 
the claims of these contending principles of core concerns of con-
tract law. But the most important claim that Hillman makes in this 
regard is his denial that any such adjudication is needed. Recall his 
statement: "The theoretical debate therefore diverts the focus from 
the reality that promissory and nonpromissory principles share the 
contract law spotlight, and that is all we can and need to know" (pp. 
7-8; emphasis added, footnotes omitted). While he is in good com-
pany in making such a claim, I think he is wrong. At a minimum, 
we should seek a theoretical reconciliation, if such can be had. 
Ironically, the failure to do so will blind us to the true complexities 
and richness of contract law, as it may have blinded Hillman to the 
complexities of promissory estoppel. 
II. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE NEED FOR 
CONTRAcr THEORY 
Not too long ago, I published a short essay, The Death of Reli-
ance,42 in which I reported the scholarly consensus - including 
such diverse writers as Daniel Farber & John Matheson, Juliet 
Kostritsky, Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, Mary Becker, and Michael 
Kelly43 - that had emerged over the past fifteen years or so, that 
detrimental reliance was not the key to understanding the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel. The scholarly literature on that point 
strongly suggested that detrimental reliance was not necessary to a 
promissory estoppel theory; its existence was not alone sufficient to 
support a promissory estoppel theory; and the measure of recovery 
39. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 29, at 121, 184; Peter Benson, Abstract Right and 
the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Con-
tract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1077, 1111 n.57 (1989); Jean Braucher, Contract Versus 
Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 703-
08 (1990). 
40. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 
88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 523-28 (1989). For my reply, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of 
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 874-97 (1992). 
41. See, e.g., p. 18 n.61 ("For another unitary theory of contract based on consent, see 
Randy E. Barnett [citing Columbia & Vrrginia Law Review articles]."). 
42. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1996). 
43. See id. at 522-27 (providing citations). 
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in promissory estoppel cases was typically the expectation interest, 
not the reliance interest. In sum, those adhering to a "reliance the-
ory" of promissory estoppel were barking up the wrong tree. 
Hillman disagreed. In 1998, he published an article reporting 
his survey of "all of the reported decisions in the United States ... 
in which promissory estoppel was discussed from July 1, 1994 
through June 30,1996."44 While he presents many interesting find-
ings about the frequency and success of actions based on promis-
sory estoppel, among them is one that challenges the scholarly 
consensus on promissory estoppel that I had summarized. Contrary 
to the "new consensus," reliance appears to be a definite require-
ment of promissory estoppel cases. The existence of reliance is dis-
cussed in 27 of 29 (93.10%) of those cases in which a promissory 
estoppel action succeeds on the merits and in 32 of 57 (56.14%) of 
those cases in which it survives a motion to dismiss. Where promis-
sory estoppel actions fail, a defect in reliance is discussed in 151 of 
270 (55.93%) of the cases, and a defect in reliance alone is discussed 
in 68 of 270 (25.19%) of the cases.45 
Curiously, while Hillman reports the total numbers of cases in 
which the absence of a promise (129), ambiguity of a promise (28), 
or refusal to accept parol evidence to prove the existence of a 
promise (8), was discussed as a reason for the failure of a promis-
sory estoppel action, he does not provide the percentages of total 
cases these figures represent. And he does not provide the number 
of cases in which the defect in the promise was the only reason 
discussed by the court for the failure of a promissory estoppel 
claim. We can hazard a guess at these figures from his statement in 
a footnote that: "One or more reasons constituting a defect in the 
promise were discussed in half of the cases (135 cases). The court 
failed to discuss a defect in reliance in only 52 of those cases."46 
From this information we might surmise that in 135 (50%) of the 
cases, one or more defects in the promise was discussed as the rea-
son for the failure of a promissory estoppel claim, and in 83 of 270 
(30.74%) of the cases, the failure of a promise was the only reason 
discussed - as compared with the 25.19% of the cases in which a 
failure of reliance is the sole reason for denying recovery. From all 
this Hillman concludes that: "Overall, the picture that emerges is 
that neither promise nor reliance dominates as a judicial reason for 
the failure of promissory estoppel claims. Rather, both elements 
are crucial to recovery."47 
44. Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on PromisSOry Estoppel: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 580, 582 (1998). 
45. See id. at 589. 
46. [d. at 599 n.87. 
47. [d. at 599. 
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Hillman's article is truly an important contribution to the prom-
issory estoppel deJ:>ate, and, for this reason, I have included two 
excerpts from it in the forthcoming edition of my casebook. His 
research shows that previous studies may well have been wrong to 
dismiss reliance as a necessary basis for recovery. On the other 
hand, the data might also mean that the absence of reliance was 
dispositive in only twenty-five percent of the cases in which promis-
sory estoppel claims are denied. That undercuts the previous wis-
dom - still prevalent among most contracts professors - that 
detrimental reliance is the sine qua non of promissory estoppe1.48 
This conclusion is also supported by the facts that (a) defects in the 
promise are the only reason provided in 30.74% of the rejected 
promissory estoppel claims, and (b) detrimental reliance is not dis-
cussed at all in 44.07% of the cases in which promissory estoppel 
actions fail. Thus, reliance may well still be dead as the exclusive 
theory of promissory estoppel, which is how many contracts teach-
ers still think of it. 
Moreover, if one distinguishes promissory estoppel as a substi-
tute for consideration (as Williston viewed it) from promissory es-
toppel as a cause of action distinct from breach of contract (as the 
court viewed it in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores,49 which many con-
tracts scholars once considered to be the harbinger of the future), 
then Hillman's results favor Williston's theory. To get enforcement 
a plaintiff needs a "promise + something." That "something" could 
be a bargain (consideration), or it could be detrimental reliance 
(promissory estoppel); but, the plaintiff needs a promise in any 
event, and what results is a contract that presumably must still sat-
isfy other contractual requirements, such as definiteness or the 
Statute of Frauds. . . 
As interesting as what Hillman finds among the cases he stud-
ied, however, is what he may have missed - and why he might 
have missed it. Hillman looked only for discussions of reliance to 
show that, contrary to the "new consensus," its presence is essential 
to promissory estoppel actions. But the problem for advocates of a 
"reliance theory" of promissory estoppel has always been distin-
guishing reasonable, justified, or foreseeable reliance from unrea-
sonable, unjustified, or unforeseeable reliance, for no contracts 
theorist thinks that any and all detrimental reliance justifies a prom-
issory estoppel claim.50 In other words, in addition to a promise, 
the plaintiff needs "reliance + something" to get a recovery under 
any reliance theory of promissory estoppel. Whatever that "some-
48. For a summary of the previous wisdom, see Barnett, supra note 42, at 518-22. 
49. 133 N.W.2d 267 (WIs. 1965). 
50. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (referring to a "prom-
ise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce" reliance by the promisee). 
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thing" is, it cannot be reliance, which is present in any event. Thus, 
all reliance theories of promissory estoppel require appeal to some 
factor apart from reliance to distinguish enforceable promises 
(which are accompanied by reliance) from unenforceable ones, and 
this is an element that reliance theorists have been unsuccessful in 
identifying. 
For this reason, it would have been helpful if Hillman had ex-
amined the cases in which the presence or absence of reliance was 
discussed, not only to "questionD the 'new consensus' on promis-
sory estoppel,"51 but also to see if he could discern the qualities 
other than reliance that made reliance sufficient or insufficient. 
This would have required Hillman to be more sensitive to the nu-
ances of contract theory than he appears to be when he claims in 
The Richness of Contract Law that "[t]he theoretical debate there-
fore diverts the focus from the reality that promissory and non-
promissory principles share the contract law spotlight, and that is all 
we can and need to know." (pp. 7-8). If that is all we can know so 
be it, but it is hardly all we need to know. 
Fortunately and coincidentally, at the time Hillman was con-
ducting his research, another contracts scholar, Sidney DeLong, 
was conducting a very similar survey of decided promissory estop-
pel cases. In his article, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reli-
ance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22,52 
DeLong surveys "all of the promissory estoppel cases reported in 
1995 and 1996."53 On this basis he, like Hillman, also takes issue 
with part of the "death of reliance" thesis I earlier presented.54 
In particular, he confirms Hillman's principal finding that the 
presence of reliance is indeed a requirement of promissory estop-
pel: "A legion of unhappy plaintiffs can bear witness to the contin-
ued vitality of the actual reliance requirement, having discovered 
that a commercial promise is not alone sufficient to ground a claim 
under Section 90."55 He also confirms Hillman's claim that both 
reliance and a promise are needed to sustain an action for promis-
sory estoppel: "It is true that in many cases, opinions affirming the 
51. Hillman, supra note 44. 
52. Sidney w. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial 
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 943. 
53. Id. at 948. 
54. His data "moderately" confirm the claim that the expectation interest, not the reli-
ance interest, is the normal measure of recovery in contracts cases. See id. at 979-8l. 
Hillman's data too undercut any claim that the reliance interest is the prevailing measure of 
damages in promissory estoppel cases. The expectation interest is regularly awarded. See 
Hillman, supra note 44, at 60l. 
55. DeLong, supra note 52, at 981; see also id. at 984 ("Every single opinion that men-
tioned the matter instead affirmed the Restatement requirement that the plaintiff actually 
rely .... Considered as a group, these holdings lay to rest Farber and Matheson's assessment 
that actual reliance is no longer an element of a claim of promissory estoppel."). 
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necessity for reliance element also involved some other missing ele-
ment. The most common defect was the absence of a clear and 
distinct promise .... "56 And he takes issue with my claim that a 
manifested intention to be legally bound should be sufficient for 
contractual enforcement even in the absence of a bargain or detri-
mental reliance.57 
DeLong's objective was not, however, simply to debunk the 
"new consensus" on promissory estoppel but also to refine existing 
general theories so as to understand better when reliance was suffi-
cient to justify the enforcement of a promise and when it was insuf-
ficient. What he finds is intriguing: Courts appear to make a 
distinction between what DeLong terms "performance reliance" 
and "enforcement reliance." With performance reliance, the 
"promisee relies solely on her estimate of the 1ikelihood that the 
promisor will perform, without any expectation of a legal remedy if 
the reliance is disappointed."58 With enforcement reliance, the 
"promisee relies both on the credibility of the promise and on the 
belief that she will have a legal remedy for some or all of the costs 
of disappointed reliance if the promise is not performed."59 While 
not claiming the existence of a judicial consensus on the matter, he 
does notice the following: 
Many of the opinions reported. in 1995 and 1996 lend support to the 
thesis that, in order to prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a com- . 
mercia! promisee must now deqlonstrate not only that her reliance 
was reasonable in light of the likelihood that the promisor would per-
form [that is, performance reliance], but also that she had a reason-
able belief that the promise was legally enforceable when made [that 
is, enforcement reliance]. Excluding those promises that are already 
enforceable under bargain contract theory, this requires that the 
promisor manifest an affirmative intention that the promise be en-
56. Id. at 985-86 (footnote omitted). This passage continues: "Many of the 1995-96 cases, 
however, denied promissory estoppel claims on the sole ground that plaintiff had not demon-
strated actual, detrimental reliance. The absence of actual reliance was decidedly determina-
tive, not merely make-weight, in these cases." Id. at 986-87 (footnote omitted). 
57. For Barnett, ... the Section 90 promise becomes binding when it is made, regard-
less of the presence or absence of subsequent reliance by the promisee. Because he 
contends that actual reliance should be unnecessary to enforceability under Section 90, 
Barnett's consent theory cannot account for the courts' continuing insistence on actual 
reliance and their refusal to enforce non-bargain promises in its absence. 
Id. at 995. But later, DeLong himself provides a possible answer to this challenge: 
[U]nder Barnett's analysis a person who manifests an intention to be legally bound to 
perform a promise might also expressly or implicitly condition the promisee's power to 
enforce the promise on her actual reliance, or might expressly or implicitly reserve a 
power to rescind the promise at any time before such reliance. 
Id. at 1000. 
58. Id. at 953. The passage continues: "The promisee decides whether and how much to 
rely by assessing the promisor's honesty and reliability, the circumstances bearing on the 
probability of performance and breach, the benefits that reliance followed by performance 
would confer, and the costs that disappointed reliance would impose." Id. 
59. Id. 
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forceable at the time of the promise. As the promise and consent 
theorists insist, the ensuing reliance is reasonable because the promise 
is enforceable, not vice versa.6O 
In sum, "the 1995-96 case sample contains several decisions sug-
gesting that a manifestation of consent to be legally bound may be 
becoming essential to liability under Section 90."61 Moreover some 
"decisions support what might be called the negative half of the 
consent theory of Section 90, which is both traditional and largely 
noncontroversial: one who expresses an intention not to be legally 
bound usually will not be."62 
One way to demonstrate the richness of contract theory and its 
importance to understanding contract law, then, is simply to read 
both Hillman's and DeLong's articles and ask which tells one more 
about contract law. Of course, Hillman can always go back and 
reexamine his data to see if it confirms DeLong's findings.63 But 
this would only be to demonstrate that knowing "that promissory 
and nonpromissory principles share the contract law spotlight" (p. 
8), was not all he needed to know to understand the richness of 
contract law. 
Another way is to examine Hillman's treatment of promissory 
estoppel,in The Richness of Contract Law. The book contains none 
of the empirical information just discussed, but it is clear that 
Hillman disagreed with those who emphasized promise over reli-
ance before he embarked upon his study. In his chapter "Theories 
of Promissory Estoppel: Reliance and Promise," he takes issue 
with "promise theorists" - in particular, Farber & Matheson64 and 
Yorio & The!. He offers one interesting insight in response to Yorio 
& Thel's claim that reliance theory cannot explain the courts' insis-
tence on the existence of a promise:65 "But Section 90 focuses on 
promise-induced reliance because other theories, such as equitable 
estoppel and misrepresentation, already protect injured parties 
60. Id. at 1003. The passage continues: 
Although the promisor's manifestation of intention to be bound is critical to these cases, 
the court's focus is usually on the promisee's actual or presumed understanding of that 
manifestation. Enforcement is denied if the court finds that the promisee was or should 
have been aware that the promise was not intended to create an enforceable obligation. 
Id. 
61. Id. at 994. 
62. Id. at 995. 
63. Hillman notes that "Professor Sydney w. Delong's impressive study of promissory 
estoppel cases was published too late to be discussed in this Article." Hillman, supra note 44, 
at 581 n.3. 
64. The article he criticizes is Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory 
Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903 (1985). 
65. See Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90,101 YALE L.J. 
111,161-62 (1991) ("[R]eliance theory does not explain why in Section 90 cases courts insist 
that there be a promise. If the basis of recovery were harm caused by the defendant's con-
duct, it should not matter whether the conduct constituted a promise." (footnote omitted». 
HeinOnline -- 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1427 1998-1999
May 1999] Contract Theory 1427 
from conduct and statements inducing detrimental reliance. Prom-
issory estoppel plugs the gap in liability by creating liability for 
promise-induced reliance" (p. 68). Mostly, however, he questions 
their interpretation of, or overgeneralization from, the cases they 
discuss - a critique that is considerably less persuasive, as a de-
scriptive matter, than his later empirical study. 
Hillman's need for an enriched theory of promissory estoppel is 
most apparent whenever he moves beyond describing judicial deci-
sions to make normative suggestions for how courts ought to treat 
cases. For example, when discussing the need to distinguish reli-
ance that merits protection from that which does not - the critical 
stumbling block for reliance theories of promissory estoppel - he 
says: "Foreseeability of the reliance seems a reasonable tool for dis-
tinguishing detrimental reliance that should and should not be com-
pensated" (p. 68; emphasis added). No reason for this intuition is 
provided. He says: 
Courts should also consider a promisor's good faith, for example, by 
taking into account the reasons for the broken promise. A court, with 
some justification, may want to punish a bad faith promisor by award-
ing expectation damages. Conversely, if a promisor acted in good 
faith and expectancy damages vastly exceed reliance damages, a court 
may choose the latter. [po 76; emphases added, footnote omitted] 
No justification for these recommendations is given. He says: 
Courts should evaluate defenses to bargained-for contracts more 
fully, for example, before they subvert them by granting expectancy 
damages under promissory estoppel. A court may conclude that a 
defense has outlived its usefulness and therefore decide the case on 
bargain grounds. Alternatively, a court may validate a contract de-
fense, but conclude that a promisee's reliance also merits some relief. 
[pp. 75-76; emphases added] 
No guidance is offered as to when courts ought to choose one alter-
native or the other. 
To support any of these normative suggestions, Hillman's con-
cluding observation that "reliance theory creates a flexible, evolv-
ing, context-dependent obligation" (p. 77) is simply no substitute 
for a theory of promissory estoppel, such as that provided by 
Sydney DeLong. But it neatly captures the instincts of the "realist" 
generation of contracts scholars who preceded him. 
CONCLUSION: THE BEST LAW SCHOOL SUBJECT 
When I was considering how I would write this review, I had 
decided to begin by making the provocative, and not entirely seri-
ous, claim that contracts was the best subject in which to specialize 
as a law professor. First, there are the merits of contracts scholar-
ship. The signal-to-noise ratio in the contracts literature is extraor-
dinarily high. Contracts scholarship is of uniformly excellent 
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quality; I rarely fail to learn from any article on contract law I read, 
and contract law publications are not too numerous to keep up 
with. There is a lot of long-standing and intricate contract doctrine 
to understand and integrate, so doing contract theory is both hard 
and rewarding. 
Probably because there are so few active contracts scholars at 
the most elite schools, contracts scholars seem to place a very low 
premium on the status or institutional affiliations of other contracts 
scholars.66 Everyone with something to say gets a real hearing. 
Though it is harder to place a contract article in elite journals, this 
also means that contracts scholars are accustomed to finding and 
taking seriously excellent articles in less prestigious journals. More-
over, as the discourse chronicled above suggests, contracts scholars 
take each other's ideas very seriously - testing and probing them 
with vigor. And I think real progress is made over time as a result 
of this scholarly exchange. 
Then there are the advantages of teaching contracts. Contracts 
is a basic first-year course so we get to teach students when they are 
at their most engaged. At many schools, contracts still run through 
a full year, so we can teach it in greater depth than any one-
semester course. Contracts is a course that raises fundamental 
questions of both justice and efficiency. In addition to the great 
debates among legal titans - Langdell, Holmes, Williston, Corbin, 
Cohen, Fuller, Llewellyn, Gilmore, Farnsworth, Macneil, Atiyah, 
Simpson, Horowitz, Fried, and the list goes on and on - there is a 
wonderful history of contract law to learn and teach. And the con-
tracts literature includes more than the usual number of articles 
about the real story behind the classic contracts cases. 
To my great surprise, however, by the time I sat down to write 
the review, I found that I had been preempted by none other than 
Robert Hillman and Robert Summers in an essay entitled The Best 
Law School Subject,67 in which they claim that "contract law is by 
far the best law school subject to teach and to learn."68 They ask: 
What other subject contains such a wealth of theory, doctrine, and 
substantive reasoning? What other subject focuses so clearly on es-
sential components of economic and other organization in our society, 
66. One of the drawbacks to being a contracts scholar is that the more prestigious the law 
school, the less obligation there appears to be to hire contracts scholars to teach first-year 
contracts classes. The prejudice is that contracts is a course that "anyone can teach." While 
this is too bad for anyone seeking to climb the ladder, it helps ensure that, among contracts 
scholars, one's reputation depends less on one's affiliation and more on one's writings than in 
most other subjects. Another drawback is that one rarely gets invited to speak at other law 
schools on contract law topics, as compared with, say, the Ninth Amendment. 
67. Robert A. Hillman & Robert S. Summers, The Best Law School Subject, 21 SEATILE 
U. L. REv. 735 (1998). This is a reply to a review of their casebook by Sydney DeLong. See 
Sydney W. DeLong, An Agnostic's Bible, 20 SEATILE U. L. REv. 295 (1997) (book review). 
68. Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 735. 
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namely private agreements and exchange transactions? What subject 
better exemplifies the power of general theory, the functions and lim-
its of the common law, the rise of statutory law, the interaction of 
rights and remedy, and the role of various legal actors in our system 
(including transactors, lawyers in their various roles, judges, and 
lawma1cers)?69 
Moreover they emphasize how much fun it is to teach contracts, in 
part perhaps because "students come to the subject with low expec-
tations. Invariably they are more than pleasantly surprised to see 
how interesting and exciting it is to learn about what promises soci-
ety legally enforces and why."70 
On this issue, then, there is no generational conflict. And I 
would add that, despite our disagreements, having active scholars 
like Robert Hillman with whom to exchange proposals and criti-
cisms makes doing contracts theory both a challenge and a joy. 
69. [d. at 735 (footnote omitted). In his review, DeLong observes that Hillman and 
Summers's casebook "offers no hope of rationalizing the[] different principles [of obligation] 
with each other or establishing authoritative ways of deciding cases when the principles come 
into conflict" and characterizes this as "both a strength and a weakness." DeLong, supra 
note 67, at 307. Hillman and Summers respond that they never attempted "to resolve the 
conflicts among the theories in one grand revelation. Indeed, no one has yet formulated a 
satisfactory 'unified field theory of civil obligation' and we doubt that anyone ever will or 
could." Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 737 (quoting DeLong). 
70. Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 735. 
